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 Authoritarian Member States in 
International Organizations   
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Matt Barg 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates under which conditions do authoritarian Member States 
exist in International Organizations that require democratic governance in 
their treaty law. The European Union is used as a case study along with two of 
its Member States that are in the process of transitioning to democracy from 
previous authoritarian regimes—Hungary and Romania. This thesis employs 
stealth authoritarian theory to analyze how a democratizing Member State may 
violate these laws and revert to authoritarian governance. It also critiques 
international enforcement mechanisms to consider their effectiveness to enforce 
their laws and norms as well as prevent an authoritarian reversal. Finally, 
cultural internalization of IO law is analyzed in order to assess the conditions 
in which a Member State’s domestic population would approve, or even call 
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Hungary was the first Soviet-occupied state to slash a hole in the Iron Curtain when it 
opened its border with Austria in 1989. Consequently, Hungary became a bastion of 
democratic hope in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Since the Fidesz government gained its supermajority in Hungary’s Parliament in 2010, 
however, the progress made toward establishing a democracy has been dismantled. 
Hungary’s decline toward authoritarianism has illuminated weaknesses in the European 
Union’s (EU) ability to enforce its fundamental values and ensure democracy in its Member 
States.1  
Prime Minister Orbán and the Fidesz government have maintained the illusion of 
democracy Hungary; all the while, they have essentially reinstated a single-party system. The 
Fidesz government drafted a new Constitution with almost no input from oppositional parties 
and the public. The new Constitution, known as the Fundamental Law, was passed without 
any votes from oppositional parties in Hungary’s Parliament, and the Fidesz government 
found a way to circumvent the constitutionally required public debate process for the 
Fundamental Law’s adoption. The Fidesez government has passed legislation without 
oppositional party influence or debate, removed political checks and balances, and redefined 
rule of law to suit its aspirations. This government has restructured the judiciary and 
bureaucratic institutions, provided Fidesz party members with tremendous electoral 
advantages, and established a means of entrenching itself into institutional frameworks for 
the unforeseeable future.2 The media is under attack and forced to self-censor. Civil society 
                                                        
1 The Fidesz party lost its supermajority by one seat in February 2015 when a special election was 
held in Veszprem to replace Tibor Navracsics, who became an EU commissioner. 
2 Rule of law is defined as “The importance of the rule of law applies to all peoples, whether of a 
particular, tribe, city state of the world. As the rule of law governs the behavior of individuals within 
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offices and the homes of non-governmental organization (NGO) employees have been 
raided. It appears that the Fidesz government has halted Hungary’s transition to democracy 
for authoritarianism. 
Democracy and rule of law in Romania, which borders Hungary to the east and is also 
a former Soviet-occupied country, have also been in jeopardy in recent years. Democratic 
hopes have remained far lower in Romania, in comparison to Hungary’s peaceful transition 
after the Soviet Union lost control over the region in the late 1980s. Romania’s transition to 
democracy has been tumultuous and began with the execution of its communist president, 
Nicolae Ceausescu. Romania’s democratic transition has been plagued by institutional 
corruption and political turmoil. In 2012, the political instability reached its pinnacle as 
Prime Minister Victor Ponta attempted to impeach his chief political opponent, President 
Traian Basecu. Prime Minister Ponta enacted emergency ordinances, even though there was 
no legitimate emergency in Romania, to remove the Constitutional Court’s review powers. 
Prime Minister Ponta also intended to remove key checks against his office and his majority 
coalition’s power in Parliament. This attempt to consolidate power through extralegal means 
was ultimately unsuccessful, primarily because of pressures from European Union actors. 
The EU has consistently had greater influence over governance in Romania when compared 
to Union’s role in Hungary. This is greatly due to the EU’s implementation of a post-
accession monitoring instrument in Romania—the Certification and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM)—that observes the Member State’s progress to correct major democratic 
deficiencies. These major democratic deficiencies in Romania include corruption of public 
officials and the independence of the judiciary. The CVM has only been applied to the 2007 
                                                                                                                                                                            
a state, so does it govern the behavior of states within the international system.” Zartner, Dana. 
Courts, Codes, and Customs: Legal Tradition and State Policy Toward International Human Rights 
and Environmental Law (2014): 5.  
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EU accession class, which included Romania and Bulgaria, and there is no monitoring tool 
for Hungary or any other EU Member States.   
The central question of this thesis is under which conditions does an authoritarian 
Member State exist in an international organization (IO) that requires democratic governance 
in its treaty law?  Specifically, this thesis aims to examine the discourse surrounding 
international organizations and their Member States, the effectiveness of IO enforcement 
mechanisms, democratization, authoritarian reversals and Member State internalization of IO 
norms. Further, the following will analyze the consequences when Member State violates the 
EU’s fundamental values of democracy and rule of law, which are found Article 2 of Treaty 
of the European Union, as well as the EU’s ability to prevent authoritarian reversals. 
Hungary and Romania will be used as case studies. Hungary and Romania’s accession into 
the EU required a certain level of democratic proficiency before the states could join the 
Union. However, each country teetered on an authoritarian reversal this decade.  
After being occupied by the Soviet Union for over four decades, both of these states 
began democratic transitions in 1989. Hungary and Romania’s democratic progress has 
waned at times. Each country has experienced egregious violations of democracy and rule of 
law principles in recent years—despite their admittance to the EU and acceptance of the 
supranational organization’s requirement of a certain level democracy, rule of law and 
human rights compliance. First, the following will examine the Member States’ government 
structures, how they have violated the EU’s fundamental values in question, and the potential 
for an authoritarian reversal. Next, this thesis will analyze the EU’s institutional enforcement 
mechanisms and democracy-building strategies. The final section assesses the internalization 
of EU law and norms into Member States in order to understand whether the domestic 
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society has adopted these norms and require public institutions to respect these norms as the 
appropriate standards of behavior. The primary objective of this thesis is not to simply point 
out incidents of democracy and rule of law violations but to also recognize when a Member 
State is systematically creating an authoritarian government. In addition, this thesis aims to 
determine the extent that an IO becomes involved and pressures a Member State to improve 
its democratic performance. 
Analysis should first scrutinize domestic governance practices and key democratic 
institutions to determine which conditions an authoritarian Member State exists in an IO. The 
first hypothesis uses stealth authoritarian theory to appraise possible authoritarian Member 
States.3 Authoritarian reversals occur nearly exclusively in transitioning states that formerly 
had authoritarian regimes. A transitioning state’s authoritarian reversal requires governments 
to work through and undermine the democratic institutions and practices that were crafted 
during its transition. Therefore, comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon requires 
observation of how transitioning IO Member States undermine democracy and rule of law to 
establish an authoritarian foothold. Stealth authoritarianism is a means of protecting and 
entrenching power when transparent authoritarian practices are not a viable option, which 
would be the case for Member States that do not wish to draw attention or hope to conceal 
their violations of IO treaty law requiring democratic governance.4 There are six indicators of 
stealth authoritarian governance: (1) the executive branch uses constitutional order to 
dominate and partially control judicial and legislative branches; (2) those in power rewrite 
laws or uses constitutional loopholes to consolidate power into the executive branch; (3) 
those in power build strong formal as well as informal institutions that are filled with ruling-
                                                        
3 Varol, Ozan. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015). 
4 Ibid. 
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party loyalists; (4) there is strong control over mass media; (5) ruling-party turnover is 
obstructed by election and campaign laws that provide incumbents with unfair electoral 
advantages over challengers; and, (6), there is a weak civil society.5 These sub-hypothesis, 
however, are not independent. Rather, they are interactive and certain components of stealth 
authoritarianism cannot be achieved until others have been completed. Despite different 
means, the outcome of stealth authoritarian practices is simply authoritarianism.  
The second hypothesis evaluates the role that IOs have in Member State 
democratization and the effectiveness of their enforcement mechanisms. This hypothesis 
estimates that IOs may be able to support transitions to democracy, but they cannot prevent 
reversals to authoritarianism in transitioning Member States for the following reasons. First, 
IOs direct enforcement mechanisms found in treaty law are weak and cannot force a Member 
State to comply with IO rules. Also, most IOs do not have mechanisms that allow them to 
intervene with military force when Member States do not comply with IO law. Second, 
indirect enforcement mechanisms (economic and political pressures) from IOs do not 
promote long-term democratic consolidation and do not prevent authoritarian reversals. 
Finally, IOs with limited monitoring and evaluating mechanisms can fail to prevent an 
authoritarian reversal. In some cases, IOs are unable to initially recognize authoritarian 
reversals because monitoring and evaluating are either ineffective or do not exist.  
The final hypothesis examines compliance and internalization of international law.  
An authoritarian Member States exists in an international organization when the IO’s norms 
have not been internalized into domestic society. Signing and ratifying treaties is only the 
first step to compliance with international law. It is necessary that Member States 
                                                        
5 Varol, Ozan. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015). 
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domestically internalize international law for it to become binding.6 Yet, accession into an IO 
only requires surface-level internalization of international law, and the internalization process 
is slow moving. This process can be disrupted or terminated in times of crisis, especially 
economic crises. Political leaders often have the ability derail the internalization and 
acceptance of IO norm process during these crises. As a result, democratic transitions are far 
more likely to fail if the public does not believe democratic governance is the appropriate 
standard of behavior from its leaders. Both the Hungarian and Romanian citizens’ faith in 
democratic political leadership and democratic principles have faltered over the past decade. 
The EU was created in response to World War II to promote international peace, 
cooperation and economic stability in the region. In 1951, six states signed the Treaty 
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 7 The main goal of this treaty was to 
create interdependence on coal and steel so that no country could mobilize its armed forces 
without others knowing.8 The Union progressed throughout the 20th century to create the 
European Economic Community,9 established a consolidated European Commission and 
Council,10 and continued to add Member States. The word ‘democracy’ was not mentioned in 
any of the Union’s treaties until 1992 when the European Union was formally created.11 
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established democracy, rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as the Union’s core values. 12 These 
                                                        
6 Zartner, Dana. “Internalization of International Law.” International Studies Compendium Project 
(2015). 
7 Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
8 http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm 
9 Treaties of Rome: EEC and EUROTOM Treaties (1957) 
10 Merger Treaty (1965), also known as the Brussels Treaty, and the Single European Act (1986) 
11 Koen Lenaerts, “The Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 62:2 (2013). 
12 Article 2 of the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) states “[t]he Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
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values, or norms, have unofficially been part of the Union since its beginning, but the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (1989-1991) likely caused the Union’s shift in focus to 
democracy in the 1992 TEU and its amendment with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Both of 
these treaties aimed to continue the advancement of democracy and rule of law in the EU.13 
The fifth enlargement of the EU took place in 2004 when the Union added ten Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) states, eight of which were former Soviet satellites that operated 
under authoritarianism.14 Accession was offered to these newly democratic states primarily to 
prevent democratic ‘backsliding’ into their former authoritarian way of governance.15 
Despite membership requirements of democracy, economic stability, and human rights 
protections, several of these CEE Member States have democratically regressed over the past 
two decades. Some of these Member States have adopted undemocratic governance practices 
that draw similarities to authoritarianism of their communist pasts. 
 Given the EU backdrop, the scope of this thesis is not to define democratic 
governance or the foundational freedoms listed in Article 2 of the TEU.  This thesis intends 
analyze global governance, international law and international organization membership 
from within the context of certain Member States, in particular Hungary and Romania. 
Investigation of the current situations in both Member States is essential, but it is also 
necessary to examine the historic influence from the Soviet occupation and communist 
dictatorship (1946-1989) in order to fully understand the current state of democracy in 
Hungary and Romania. These case studies will offer insight into democratic transitions from 
                                                                                                                                                                            
law, principles which are common to the Member States.” These principles are also found in the 5th 
Recital of the TEU’s Preamble, as well as the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the 1992 TEU.  
13 http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm. 
14 Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia.  
15 Attila Ágh, “The Triple Crisis in Hungary: The ‘Backsliding’ of Hungarian Democracy after 
Twenty Years,” Romanian Journal of Political Science 13:1 (2013).  
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communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the possibility of authoritarian reversals, EU 
accession process and its enforcement mechanisms, and democratic norm internalization into 
domestic cultures. 
Literature Review 
To answer the central thesis question, this thesis employs a theoretical approach that 
utilizes multiple perspectives to explain the conditions in which an authoritarian Member 
State exists in an IO that legally requires democracy from its members. The first theoretical 
approach used is stealth authoritarian, and it considers how a Member State constructs an 
authoritarian regime despite democratic requirements from the IO it belongs to. The second 
theoretical approach comes from the viewpoint of the IO and its enforcement mechanisms to 
prevent Member States from building authoritarian regimes. The final theoretical approach 
examines the role of the Member State’s domestic society and culture in order to evaluate 
what to degree the public has internalized the IO’s democratic norms and laws. These 
different vantage points aim to collectivity explain the conditions in which authoritarian 
Member States exist in IOs. 
Stealth Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Governance 
Following the Cold War, democracy clauses have been placed in international 
agreements and treaties to establish democracy as a fundamental norm for certain IOs. The 
democracy clauses in IO treaties also sanction regimes that abuse their authority through 
extra-legal means. Democracy clauses included into treaties can be found in the EU, the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe, and the African Union (AU). 
16 For instance, Chapter II Article 3 of the OAS Charter states, “The solidarity of the 
American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political 
                                                        
16 David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism,” UC Davis Law Review 47 (2013). 
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organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative 
democracy.”17 Also, the African Union created the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance in the early 2000s to provide specific guidelines for democratic governance. 
Establishing these norms within IOs has led to the elimination of many transparent 
authoritarian regimes.18 The decline of transparent authoritarianism, however, has resulted in 
a new authoritarian practices. The growth of civil society around the globe has been a key 
contributor for leaders to reconsideration their means of authoritarianism, since civil society 
groups aims to expose undemocratic practices and human rights violations. In addition, IO 
treaty law that requires democratic governance has caused some Member State leaders with 
authoritarian objectives to employ more discrete tactics to achieve their authoritarian goals. 
“Stealth authoritarianism serves as a way to protect and entrench power when direct 
repression is not a viable option,” which is the case for Member States that adopt 
authoritarian governance practices in international organizations that require democracy.19 
Some authoritarian leaders have since transformed their governance practices to play 
by the same rules as democratic governments.20 Stealth authoritarian regimes use democratic 
institutions and practices to create an illusion of legitimacy that masks authoritarianism. 
These practices include rewriting constitutions, constitutional amendments, revising court 
structures and review powers, appointing judges without oppositional party input, providing 
bureaucratic or state institutions with increased powers or duties that formerly belonged to 
judicial or legislative branches, and empowering the executive branch to dominate legislative 
                                                        
17 Charter of the Organization of American States. 
18 Varol, Ozan. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015).  
19 Ibid, 1678. 
20 “Stealth Authoritarianism”; Hahn, Gordon M. "Managed democracy? Building stealth 
authoritarianism in St. Petersburg." DEMOKRATIZATSIYA-WASHINGTON- 12, no. 2 (2004): 195-
232. 
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and judicial branches to rewrite or influence law.21 Stealth authoritarianism makes it 
increasingly difficult for outside observers to identify and eradicate governance in 
comparison to transparent authoritarian regimes, like those of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin or 
Saddam Hussein.22  Stealth authoritarianism regimes are those that use legal mechanisms in 
generally accepted democratic states for anti-democratic ends, such as elections, 
constitutional amendment procedures, and judicial review powers.23 These claims have been 
made in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Ethiopia and Romania. 
This thesis tests the components of stealth authoritarianism in its case studies to 
evaluate the state of democracy in Hungary and Romania and to determine whether these 
governments are authoritarian. Stealth authoritarianism has six interrelated and interactive 
components: (1) constitutional order provides the executive branch the power to dominate 
and partially control judicial and legislative branches; (2) weak formal institutions and rule of 
law; (3) strong informal institutions and networks, which are filled with ruling party loyalists, 
that use their power to threaten and persuade opponents; (4) weak civil society; (5) subtle 
constitutional violations and maximum usage of loopholes in the constitutional order; (6) 
and, control over the mass media.24 Often, international organizations struggle to properly 
diagnose stealth authoritarian governance. This is primarily because these organizations 
consider these components individually and independently as democratic violations rather 
than comprehensively appraising the interaction of these components, which produces 
something far worse than the violation of a single IO law. International organizations also 
                                                        
21 “Ibid. (BOTH Stealths above) 
22 “Stealth Authoritarianism.” 
23 Ibid.  
24 “Stealth Authoritarianism.”  Hahn, Gordon M. "Managed democracy? Building stealth 
authoritarianism in St. Petersburg." DEMOKRATIZATSIYA-WASHINGTON- 12, no. 2 (2004): 195-
232. 
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generally combat these components individually and independently. This approach often 
leads to IOs failure to prevent authoritarianism, because the matter is not addressed 
systematically.  
The toolbox of stealth authoritarian regimes includes using judicial review not as a 
check on the political branches of government, but as a tool to consolidate power into the 
executive branch and remove accountability for politicians. Stealth authoritarian leaders 
often use libel and defamation lawsuits against dissidents, which creates self-censorship in 
the media.  Legislators in the authoritarian faction adopt electoral laws to disenfranchise 
oppositional parties as well as increase the difficulty to remove incumbents. The toolbox also 
includes prosecuting political dissidents and opponents with non-political crimes, like tax 
evasion or embezzlement, using internationally-supported surveillance laws and institutions 
to blackmail or discredit political opponents. In addition, these leaders often enact democratic 
reforms and rule of law rhetoric to sculpt public perceptions and deflect attention from 
undemocratic practices.25 
It is necessary to define the traditional form of authoritarianism to not only 
demonstrate the similarities between the two forms but to also highlight the differences. The 
forms of authoritarianism utilize different means; however, the undemocratic ends are 
incredibly similar. Authoritarianism is traditionally defined as a “legal order in which there is 
little or no political pluralism and the incumbent party acts ‘via legal or extralegal means, to 
suppress political opposition.’”26 Corruption and abuse of state resources are widespread. It is 
incredibly difficult to remove the incumbent party through elections, and regime change is 
                                                        
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
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typically only possible by a transition, revolution, coup d’état, or foreign intervention.27 
Traditional, or transparent, authoritarian regimes generally have a set of common 
mechanisms. These mechanisms include overtly defying or disregarding laws and 
constitutions,28 imposing emergency laws or martial law, silencing dissidents with 
harassment and violence,29 closure of media outlets and banning publications,30 vote count 
manipulation through vote buying, intimidation, and electoral fraud,31 packing courts and 
replacing constitutions to remove checks and balances on the authoritarian government’s 
power.32 Traditional authoritarian governance is far more blatant and easily detected by 
international organizations and the international community when compared to the subtle, 
more covert mechanisms utilized in stealth authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, stealth 
authoritarian uses variations of these tactics with for the same authoritarian ends. 
The law is a crucial tool for stealth authoritarian regimes. These regimes use law to 
entrench the status quo, protect their incumbents from democratic challenges, and create a 
dominate-party or single-party state.33 The single-party state still has oppositional parties, but 
oppositional parties have almost no input in governance. These governments are able to grasp 
great amounts of power through legal maneuvering and often enact ‘constitutional coups,’ 
which “through a series of perfectly legal moves the constitutionally devious leaders can 
                                                        
27 Ibid.  
28 Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory (1996), 9-10; Miguel González Marcos, 
“Comparative Law at the Service of Democracy: A Reading of Arosemena’s Constitutional Studies of 
the Latin American Governments,” Boston University International Law Journal 21, 259-278 (2003). 
29 Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold 
War (2010). 
30 Gordon Silverstein, “Singapore: The Exception That Proves the Rule” in Rule by Law: The Politics 
of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa eds. (2008).  
31 Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral 
Authoritarianism (2013).  
32 Levitsky & Way, ibid.  
33 Varol, supra note 1.  
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achieve a substantively anti-constitutional result.”34 A constitutional coup is constitutional 
because there is no break in legality—the government doesn’t violate any laws to achieve its 
goals. It is a coup because the prior constitutional order is turned on its head without a 
legitimating process for the changes made.35 In worst-case scenarios, constitutional coups 
transform a state from a constitutional democracy to an authoritarian regime while appearing 
to respect the constitution through the process.36  
One of the clearest indications that a state is becoming authoritarian, regardless of 
whether it’s stealth or traditional authoritarianism, is the leadership’s manipulation of the 
electoral environment so that electoral outcomes almost always have a predetermined 
conclusion.37 Electoral turnover, or partisan alternation, is a core component of democracy 
and allows the electoral system to respond to electoral preferences. Electoral turnover proves 
that incumbents can be “dethroned.”38 Election and media laws give authoritarian incumbents 
advantages that are supplemented by the selective application of the laws against challengers 
in the election. This combination provides incumbents with nearly insurmountable 
advantages.39  
A democratizing state’s reversal to authoritarianism requires the government to work 
through and undermine the democratic institutions and practices that were crafted during the 
democratic transition. Assessment of stealth authoritarian components can help determine 
whether a Member State is systematically creating a stealth authoritarian government or just 
                                                        
34 Scheppele, Kim Lane. "Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions 
can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary)." Transnat'l L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 23 (2014): 51. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Hahn, Gordon M. "Managed democracy? Building stealth authoritarianism in St. 




violating democracy and rule of law principles in an isolated fashion without an authoritarian 
objective; moreover, a government is simply violating a democratic principle but not with the 
intention of building an authoritarian government. At times, democratic governments violate 
democratic principles, like restricting freedoms and imposing laws through the executive 
branch without following legislative protocol after a terrorist attack. Nevertheless, this does 
not necessarily mean that this government is attempting to create an authoritarian regime.  
Application of stealth authoritarian theory to the following case studies will help 
make the distinction of whether a transitioning Member State is in the process an 
authoritarian reversal, or whether the Member State suffers from democratic deficiencies but 
is ultimately headed toward democratic consolidation. Because EU Member States are 
required to have a certain level of democratic progress prior to accession, this theory will 
provide insight to the state of democracy and authoritarianism in these Member States. This 
is a relatively novel theory and has not been academically critiqued. Employing this theory in 
the context of international organizations should provide further insights into stealth 
authoritarian theory. 
Democratization: International Organizations and the Domestic State 
 Samuel Huntington argued that democratization in the developing world is “an 
important—perhaps the most important—global political development of the late twentieth 
century.”40 Democratization has been widely studied. Much of the democratization 
scholarship examines the transition from authoritarianism to democracy as one that is 
confined to internal national forces. The growing presence of international organizations in 
global and national politics has recently led scholars to consider the role of external 
                                                        
40 Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, 
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, xiii (1991). 
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democratization factors, in this case international organizations. Some scholars have claimed 
that international actors are essential for a successful regime transformation.41 Existing 
democratic countries, like the U.S. and Western European states, have made democracy 
promotion a foreign policy goal. International organizations have been a significant tool for 
achieving these ends.42 For example, the IO-democracy relationship has helped justify the 
growth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, Council of Europe, and 
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), in which these organizations have 
promoted democracy by adding Member States that are transitioning to democracy from 
authoritarian regimes.43 
  Scholarly consideration of the relationship between international and domestic 
politics first began with the “second image reversed” theory, which observes how 
international factors affect domestic structures.44 This theory surveys various international 
factors, including international economic trends, military intervention, and the anarchic 
structure of the international system and how IOs affect domestic political structures. The 
factors that affect domestic political structures include electoral outcomes, regime type, 
domestic coalitions, and trade policies. The second image reversed theory recognizes that 
despite the fact that international factors may potentially have a powerful external influence 
over domestic regimes, the extent of these international factors influence requires some link 
                                                        
41 Ekiert, Grzegorz et al. “Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest?” Eastern 
European Politics and Societies 21:7 (2007). 
42 Christopher, Warren. “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity.” Foreign Policy 98 (1995). 
43 Pevehouse, Jon C. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democracy.” 
International Organization 56:3 (2002).  
44 The “second image reversed” theory was first introduced by Peter Gourevitch. “The Second Image 
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” International Organization 32:4 (1978). 
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to the domestic political process.45 In response to this original theory, academic scholarship 
of how international organizations affect Member States’ domestic democratization has 
primarily fallen into two groups: ‘democratization from above’ and the transitional-
consolidation theorists. 
 First, democratization from above theory contends that IOs can support the 
democratization of formerly undemocratic Member States.46 Jon Pevehouse argues that there 
are three potential causal mechanisms that explain the effects that IOs can have on regime 
change. First, authoritarian regimes can be compelled to liberalize by economic and 
diplomatic pressures from IOs when these pressures are paired with internal pressures, such 
as protests and social movements. Economic pressures from an IO can create fiscal hardships 
on the regime through trade suspensions and seizure of financial benefits. 47 Diplomatic 
pressures can result in international isolation that further de-legitimizes the regime 
domestically, and during times of crisis a regime’s international standing may be particularly 
important. Public and elite perception of the regime can be weakened if allies and 
institutional partners treat the state as an outcast. 48 Second, IO membership can lead certain 
elite groups to accept liberalization because membership lowers the risks that these groups 
face during democratization. There will inherently be groups of elites that will attempt to 
stop the liberalization process. IO membership obstructs these groups by making credible 
guarantees to key groups that reduce their fears of democratization. Finally, acceptance of 
                                                        
45 Peter Gourevitch. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” 
International Organization 32:4 (1978). 
46 Pevehouse, Jon C. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democracy.” 
International Organization 56:3 (2002). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Whitehead, Laurence. “Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics 
Perspective.” In The International Aspects of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Ed. 
Whitehead, Laurence. Oxford, Oxford University Press (1996). 
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liberalization can occur through either a hand-tying process or through the socialization of 
domestic elites. The socialization process involved in accession into an IO helps persuade 
elites to be less resistant to the liberalization process by changing their belief systems. This is 
done when IOs act as an external guarantor of their interests, rights and preferences, or by 
adjusting preferences during the socialization process.49  
 In opposition to democratization from above theory, the transitional-consolidation 
camp argues that IOs may be able to promote democracy through the means described above, 
but ultimately IOs cannot prevent or stop authoritarian reversals. Transitional-consolidation 
theorists argue that ‘democratization from above’ arguments fail to distinguish between the 
effects that IOs have on the temporary survival of a transitional democracy and the effects 
that ensure long-term democratic consolidation. Milan Svolik argues that scholarship must 
distinguish between ‘transitional’ and ‘consolidated’ democracies, because each one has 
different challenges to prevent regression to authoritarianism.50 The threat of an authoritarian 
reversal is constant in transitional democracies, but authoritarian reversals are rare in 
consolidated democracies.51 Therefore, democratic consolidation suggests a qualitative 
change has taken place that nearly eliminates the possibility of authoritarian reversion rather 
than mere democratic survival.52 However, it is difficult to measure whether or not a state has 
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achieved democratic consolidation.53 A transitional democracy may resist an authoritarian 
reversal for a sustained period of time when conditions are favorable, but it still may be at 
risk. The factors that enable democratic consolidation and avert authoritarian reversal include 
economic performance, wealth, previous military rule, political structures and a combination 
of these factors.54  
 The transitional-consolidation theory suggests that by not addressing this distinction 
between transitioning and consolidation that ‘democratization from above’ theorists falsely 
suggest that international organizations can promote consolidation as well as prevent 
reversals to authoritarianism.55 IOs can foster consolidation in transitional democracies by 
building capacity and providing technical expertise, coordinating between public and private 
actors, and enhancing transparency.56 The transitional-consolidation argument claims that 
IOs cannot stop authoritarian reversals in transitioning democracies, despite their ability 
promote democratic consolidation. This is because IOs do not have enforcement mechanisms 
strong enough to prevent a reversal.57 There are very few IOs have mechanisms to enforce 
their policies with forceful military intervention. The economic sanctions, political pressures 
and internal enforcement mechanisms used against noncompliant Member States don’t carry 
enough weight to prevent these reversals.  
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 This thesis uses the second-image reversed perspective to observe the role that IOs 
play in national democratization process of their Member States. The ‘democratization from 
above’ theory provides insights to promoting democratic consolidation for Member States 
and the strategies utilize in the hopes of preventing authoritarian reversals. However, this 
thesis contends that the transitional-consolidation theory is appropriate in the case of the EU, 
because the EU does not have enforcement mechanisms strong enough to prevent a reversal. 
While it is necessary to observe the role that IOs have on Member State democratization, 
analysis of internalization and compliance of international law is the next step to 
comprehensively study why a transitioning Member States reverts to an authoritarian regime 
and violates IO law.  
Internalization and Compliance with International Law 
 Internalization of international law is defined as “the process by which nations 
incorporate international law concepts into domestic practice.”58 Ratification of international 
treaties or acceptance of a customary international law principle technically binds a state to 
follow the rule, but there is widespread agreement that international law is not fully 
implemented until it has been internalized domestically.59 Transitioning Member States that 
have not internalized an IO’s treaty law requirements for democratic governance into their 
domestic institutions, or a if Member State’s domestic society has not deemed democracy 
and rule of law as the appropriate behavior for governance, are far less likely to reach 
democratic consolidation. Therefore, these Member States are more vulnerable for 
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authoritarian reversals. The “logic of appropriateness” declares that actors, both elites 
working in government and individual citizens, are required to have a binding sense of 
obligation to law before it becomes accepted as the appropriate standard of behavior.60 The 
logic of appropriateness leads to the creation of international norms, which is defined as “a 
standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” 61 International relations 
scholarship defines international norms as, “shared understandings of standards of 
behavior,”62 which “guide human behavior,”63 that “indicate how a state should behave.”64 
The most widely accepted theory of norm development and emergence in international legal 
studies scholarship is the emergence through a norm entrepreneur.65  
When a new concept becomes an international norm, it typically starts with a norm 
entrepreneur, which is a person, group of people, institution or a state that has strong notions 
about the appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.66 After the norm emerges and 
is advocated by the entrepreneur, decision-makers increasingly recognize the norm until it 
reaches a tipping point where the norm attains recognition. Next, there is a torrent of 
recognition and acceptance of the norm by the general population. Ultimately, the norm 
becomes widely accepted and ingrained into a society to the point where it becomes the 
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standard of appropriate behavior.67 However, the sociological perspective of international 
norms provides a more encompassing definition in which international norms are established 
through institutions; that is, international norms are “a relatively stable collection of practices 
and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations.”68 
Regardless, international law and international norms are so tightly linked that the two terms 
can be used interchangeably.69 Since the sociological prospective advances the international 
relations definition, this thesis combines these two terms for its definition of international 
norms. 
Understanding how states internalize international law is essential to understanding 
the role of international law within a specific state. In order to fill the void for weak or 
nonexistent enforcement capabilities, international law needs to be internalized into the fabric 
of domestic law to make the international legal rules punishable by domestic legal 
mechanisms.70 Domestic populations cannot perceive international laws as appropriate, and 
therefore binding, until the international laws have been embedded and accepted into the 
domestic legal culture and institutions, which comprise a state’s legal tradition. 71 Cultural 
attributes of legal tradition include purpose of law, origins of law, and concern about 
reputation as a law abider. Institutional attributes include separation of powers and strength 
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of the judiciary, hierarchy of law, and monist versus dualist position.72 A state’s legal 
tradition can provide great insight to compliance with international law and internalization of 
IO norms.  
A democratizing state’s legal tradition has often changed dramatically as the state 
transitions between regime-types. Democratizing states typically have to completely rebuild 
their legal institutions and governance structures in the process, which includes transforming 
their institutional attributes mentioned above. The cultural attributes need to follow these 
institutional modifications in order for democratic and rule of law principles to be 
comprehensively internalized. Crises can impede internalization of democratic norms 
institutionally and culturally. Commonly, economic crises obstruct internalization of 
democratic norms, but even accession into an IO can create a crisis capable of blocking 
internalization. 
This thesis uses internalization, norm adoption and legal tradition theory in its case 
studies to explain why a Member State violates EU laws, norms, and potentially implements 
authoritarian practices.  Hungary and Romania had to completely reconfigure their legal 
tradition not only during the democratization process but to also align with EU norms. In 
addition, this theoretical approach considers the effects the 2008 global economic crisis had 
on the internalization process. Both of these countries had only just become Member States 
prior to the global economic crisis in 2008. Their legal traditions had not fully adopted 
democracy and EU norms. The economic crisis partially influenced each country’s domestic 
society to lose of faith in democracy and the EU as effective governance structures. 
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Therefore, domestic societies did not require their leaders to fully comply with democratic 
principles.  
Methodology 
 This thesis takes a comparative legal studies approach. The principal research 
methodology employed below is content analysis of primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources used in this research are European Union treaties, the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law and legislation, the Romanian Fundamental Law and legislation, 
Constitutional Court decisions in both countries, civil society reports, studies and research 
projects conducted at Central European University’s Center for Media, Data and Society, and 
reports by European institutions.   
The primary research relied greatly on the Council of Europe’s European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Even though the Venice 
Commission is not an EU institution, this Commission provides comprehensive legal 
opinions examining laws and institutional structures for potential violations of democratic 
principles and European norms. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the studies conducted by its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights provided data and analysis for electoral fairness and national relevant electoral laws. 
Reports prepared by Amnesty International provided information regarding civil society and 
NGOs. Secondary sources include scholarly journal articles and books that examine 
democratic and economic transitions of Central and Eastern European countries, national 
politics in the region, democracy building, authoritarianism and international organizations, 
especially the European Union.  
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 Curiosity into governance in Hungary initially began after a proposed Internet tax 
failed to be enacted after thousands of protesters gathered in its opposition in Budapest. I 
intended to research the Fidesz government’s policies for Internet governance but quickly 
realized that Hungary had a much larger, systemic issue with its government.  I spent the 
summer of 2015 in Budapest at Central European University’s Center for Media, Data and 
Society as an intern and a research fellow. General assessment and assumptions about the 
state of Hungary and the region’s national governments have been formulated through my 
work with Central-Eastern European scholars, lawyers at the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union, and observations through personal experiences during my time spent in Hungary. I 
also led discussion groups at CEU’s summer course in Advanced Topics of Internet 
Governance, Civil Society and Policy Advocacy with regional freedom of expression and 
media experts to learn about global attitudes towards Hungary’s governance and media 
policies. 
 This thesis then researched Romania to provide context for the Hungarian 
government. Romania and Hungary have several commonalities. They both were Soviet-
occupied states following World War II, and began their democratic transitions in 1989. 
They both have also recently joined the EU and have struggled to ensure democracy and rule 
of law in this decade. Aside from these broad commonalities, Prime Minister Ponta’s actions 
in 2012 appeared to be strikingly similar to those of the Fidesz government. However, the 
EU had far greater influence over governance in Romania compared to Hungary. Therefore, 




Member State Authoritarian Reversals  
International organizations that value democracy as a key tenet of the organization 
typically require that Member States meet minimum standards of democracy before 
accession. IO membership is often one of the reasons that prompt a former authoritarian state 
to democratize. A democratizing state’s reversal to authoritarian requires the government and 
its actors in the reversal to work through and undermine the democratic institutions and 
practices that were crafted during the democratic transition. In order to assess whether a 
Member State is systematically and overtly creating an authoritarian government or just 
violating democracy and rule of law principles without an authoritarian objective, this section 
uses stealth authoritarian theory to make this determination through case studies. To measure 
stealth authoritarianism, case studies analyze its six components. Democratizing Member 
States are more likely to move toward authoritarianism when the following forces are 
present: (1) the executive branch uses constitutional order to dominate and partially control 
judicial and legislative branches; (2) the regime rewrites law or uses constitutional loopholes 
to consolidate power into the executive branch; (3) the regime builds strong formal as well as 
informal institutions that are filled with ruling-party loyalists; (4) the regime has strong 
control over mass media; (5) ruling-party turnover is obstructed by election and campaign 
laws that provide incumbents with unfair electoral advantages over challengers; and, (6), 
there is a weak civil society. These sub-hypothesis, however, are not independent. Rather, 
they are interactive and certain components cannot be achieved if others are not present.  
This section employs these six stealth authoritarian hypotheses on both the current 
situations in Hungary and Romania to determine whether they have engaged stealth 
authoritarian governance and experienced an authoritarian reversal. The second section will 
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analyze the EU’s enforcement mechanisms and response to undemocratic practices in these 
case studies.  Finally, the internalization of international law section will explore why these 
case studies have not complied with the EU’s democratic norms and laws in certain scenarios 
and the effect that crises have had on the democratization and the norm internalization 
process.  
Case Study: The Fidesz Government in Hungary 
In Hungary’s 2010 election, the Fidesz party and its coalition with the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) won more than two-thirds of seats in Parliament, after 
they won nearly 53 percent of the popular vote.73 Despite the authoritarian practices of the 
Fidesz government after winning its supermajority, this was a free and fair election. Due to 
disproportionate electoral laws, 53 percent of the popular vote translated into 68 percent of 
Parliamentary seats. 74 In a proportionate electoral system the percentage of votes won for a 
particular party equals the percentage of seats won in Parliament. However, Hungary’s 
disproportionate electoral system is weighted and provides extra seats, which is how 53 
percent of the popular vote translated into 68 percent of the seats in Parliament. The 
disproportionate election system was created as Hungary was transitioning into democracy in 
1989.  Leaders in the transition created this disproportionate electoral system in order to 
promote pluralism in Parliament, prevent the communists from regaining control, and to 
provide smaller parties with more seats. In 2010, this system backfired for proponents of 
democracy. The Fidesz party has been able to grab a tremendous amount of power and pass 
legislation without debate or votes from other parties in Parliament.  
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The Fidesz party was able to quickly grab power partially because of Hungary’s weak 
separations between its branches of government. As portrayed in Figure 1 below, Hungary 
has a unicameral Parliament. There are limited checks built in the Hungary’s government 
structure. There is no real separation between legislative branch and the Prime Minister, 
because the majority party in Parliament selects the Prime Minister. Also, the majority party 
selects the President.  There are incredibly weak separations between legislative and 
executive branches. Therefore, a strong and independent Constitutional Court in Hungary is 
an essential check against other political branches. The Constitutional Court is the only 
formal check against the legislative and executive branch. The leaders of the democratic 
transition understood this and knew the importance adding checks to its democratizing 
government. 



















 Hungary held its first free and fair elections for the first time in over four decades in 
1990. As Hungary was transitioning into democracy in 1989, the leaders of the transition 
heavily amended the 1949 Stalinist-era constitution (Act XX of 1949) at roundtable 
meetings. 75 The amendments to Act XX of 1949 created a constitution that met the standards 
of a modern, democratic constitution that protected human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.76 The roundtable meetings, which were comprised of oppositional parties and the 
communists who had just lost their 40-year grip in the country, were concerned with two 
hazards to Hungary’s transition to a multiparty democracy: a fractured parliament where 
small parties were unable to form stable coalitions, which was addressed by the 
disproportionate electoral system, and a deeply entrenched constitution that would be too 
difficult to change once the new democratic leaders gauged how they wanted to design their 
political institutions.77 The amendments, also known as the 1989 Constitution due to such 
vast changes to the previous Constitution, established an amendment process that required a 
two-thirds majority vote to amend the Constitution. This created an amendment threshold 
that was attainable and not excessively demanding that the Constitution could not be 
amended as democratic leaders began to recognize what Hungary needed to democratize. 78 
The leaders of the transitions also made structural adjustments to bolster democratic 
governance. 
                                                        
75 At the time the country was known as the Republic of Hungary, which was later changed to 
Hungary by the Fundamental Law that was enacted in Jan. 1, 2012.  
76 Kis, János. “From the 1989 Constitution to the 2011 Fundamental Law.” Constitution for a 
Disunited Nation: on Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law” ed. Tóth, Gábor A. Budapest-New York: 
Central European University Press (2012). 
77 Bánkuti, Miklós et al. “Disabling the Constitution.” Journal of Democracy 23:3 (2012). 
78 There was no break in legality from Act XX of 1949, and “the 1989 Constitution” is the amended 
Act XX of 1949.  
 31 
The 1989 Constitution established a judicial check against the other branches when it 
created the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was constructed to be independent 
and have wide powers of judicial review to check the powers of the executive and legislative 
branches. The 1989 Constitution established actio popularis to bring matters before the 
Constitutional Court. Actio popularis allows anyone to bring a case before the Court, not just 
those affected by the law, to review laws for constitutionality. As a result, nearly every 
important law was challenged before for the Court. Indeed, the Constitutional Court became 
the highest respected political institution in Hungary in the early stages of the transition.79  
In addition to the Constitutional Court, the 1989 Constitution made additional checks 
against Hungary’s unicameral parliamentary system. It established the public consultation 
process, which changed Parliamentary procedure to require extensive consultation with civil 
society and opposition parties before bills can be put to a vote. Four ombudsmen were also 
added to monitor Parliament and ensure that human rights were protected. Further, the 
amendments created politically independent bureaucratic institutions: the central bank, state 
audit office, prosecutor general’s office, national election commission and the media board. 
Up until the Fidesz government’s victory in 2010, Hungary’s transition to democracy had 
been relatively successful in comparison to other democratizing states in Eastern Europe. 
Scholarship prior to 2010 generally applauded Hungary’s democratic advancements and 
found the country to be a beacon of democratic hope for the former Soviet-controlled states. 
Despite these democratic advancements, nearly all of these checks have been 
eliminated once the Fidesz Party took power in 2010. Table 1 summarizes the components of 
stealth authoritarian in Hungary and the current state of these components. Hungary’s 
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Parliament has become a political tool of Prime Minister Orbán’s office. There is essentially 
no separation between Parliament and the executive branch because of the majority party’s 
power to choose the Prime Minister and the primarily ceremonial President of Hungary. Due 
to limited institutional separation and coordination between the Prime Minister’s Office, 
Parliament and the Presidency, reference of these institutions will be consolidated into ‘the 
government’ throughout this thesis. The government’s leader is Prime Minister Victor Orbán. 
This case study investigates each of the components of stealth authoritarian on the Fidesz 
government since it gained power in 2010. 
Table 1: Stealth Authoritarian Indicators in Hungary 
Legal Tool to Consolidate Power Supermajority in Parliament 
Strength of the Judiciary Weak 
Strength of Formal Institutions Checks on 
Government 
Weak 
Informal Institutions Packed with Fidesz Loyalists 
Control over Mass Media Strong 
Strength of Civil Society Weak-Moderate  
Frequent Attacks by the Government 
 
Use of Law and Constitutional Loopholes for Executive Branch Consolidation 
The first sign that the Fidesz government was moving towards stealth authoritarian 
occurred into just its third month in power. The Fidesz government used its supermajority to 
amend the four-fifths rule for drafting a new constitution. In 1995, the Socialist (MszP) 
majority government amended the 1989 Constitution procedural rule for drafting a new 
Constitution from a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament to require a four-fifths vote. The 
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amendment required oppositional party input and cooperation in the drafting process. The 
new rule essentially required a “super” supermajority for writing a new constitution.80  
After the Fidesz government easily amended the four-fifths rule with its 
supermajority, it began to write a new Constitution. The drafting process took place from 
October 2010 to April 2011 and consisted of two disconnected stages: an inconsequential 
public stage (stage 1) and a consequential secret stage (stage 2).81 In October 2011, a 
constitutional commission, called the Salamon Commission after its chair László Salamon 
and comprised of members of Parliament (MPs), was given the task of to create a list of 
principles for the new Constitution.82 The meetings were open and civil society groups were 
able to provide their opinions. The list of principles, however, did not reflect any of the 
opinions or proposals made by civil society or the ‘democratic opposition’ parties in 
Parliament—the Socialist MszP party and the new Green LMP party.83 The democratic 
opposition parties left the Salamon Commission when none of their proposals were accepted. 
Nevertheless, the Fidesz bloc approved the Commission’s constitutional principles on March 
7, 2011, with a Parliamentary resolution.84  
In stage 2, which also began on March 7, 2011, the approved resolution stated that 
members of Parliament (MPs) had one week to propose a complete draft of the new 
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constitution due to the national holiday commemorating the 1848 Revolution that takes place 
on March 15th each year. The resolution also stated that the proposed Constitution could be 
written with or without taking the draft principles into account. The first stage of the drafting 
process was disconnected from the second, and the drafts were written in secrecy. It is 
rumored that the Constitution’s lead author, József Szájer, wrote much of it on his iPad.85 
Szájer at the time was not even a member of Hungarian Parliament. Nevertheless, Szájer is a 
member of the party’s inner circle and a Fidesz member to the European Parliament. There is 
no official record of who was involved in the drafting process, consultation, opinions 
engaged, or how the final draft was created, despite many Fidesz MPs claiming credit for 
being part of the process.  
The draft of the Constitution came out on March 14, 2011, and was introduced into 
Parliament as a private member’s bill by Péter Ágh from the Fidesz party and András 
Andradszki from the Christian Democratic party. A private member’s bill in Hungarian 
Parliament bypasses steps normally required by government bills. Government bills typically 
require impact assessment as well as consultation from relevant agencies that must enforce 
the law and civil society groups that would be affected by the law. Because the impact 
assessment and consultation were not required, they were of course not performed by 
Parliament. Regardless, the Fidesz bloc insists that the public was involved in the 
consultation process since they sent out questionnaires to registered voters in late February 
and early March 2011. However, the questionnaire did not address any substantive questions 
about constitutional design and were sent out right before the constitutional draft appeared, 
which meant that the questionnaires could not be collected and assessed in time to affect the 
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draft. On April 18, 2011, the Fidesz bloc in Parliament passed the new Constitution (the 
Fundamental Law) without a single vote from opposition parties. The Socialist MszP and 
new Green LMP parties abstained from voting as a form of protest, but votes from these 
parties would have been inconsequential due to the Fidesz supermajority. During the drafting 
process and prior to adoption, thousands of protesters demonstrated in Budapest to voice 
their disapproval and hope to persuade the government not to adopt the new Constitution. 
Protesters were concerned with the government overextending its power, limitations on 
freedoms, and forcing Christian ideology onto citizens. Nevertheless, the voices of those who 
opposed the Fundamental Law were not powerless to prevent its adoption. 
 The Fidesz government has successfully achieved a key element of stealth 
authoritarianism. The government first used its supermajority to amend the rules for drafting 
a new Constitution. Several procedural rules were bypassed, like public consultation and 
impact assessment. Next, the Fidesz government was able to write the Fundamental Law 
without any input in drafting the document from oppositional parties, without a legitimate 
debate Parliament, and without a single vote from opposing parties. Now that the Fidesz 
government has created its constitutional order, the government begins to dismantle formal 
checks against its centralized power. 
Dismantling the Judiciary and Formal Checks Against the Executive Branch 
The leaders of the 1989 democratic transition recognized that the unicameral 
parliamentary system in Hungary relies on a formal judiciary institution to check the power 
of the closely-knit legislative and executive branches. As the Fidesz government established 
its authority in Parliament, the Prime Minister’s office and the Presidential office, it began to 
dismantle the Constitutional Court in order to further consolidate power. Elimination of the 
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Constitutional Court’s strength and independence would essentially eliminate all the formal 
checks against the Fidesz government. It is necessary to examine a series of legal battles 
between the Constitutional Court and the Fidesz government—along with uncontested 
legislation—to realize certain interactive components of stealth authoritarianism: 
consolidation of power for executive branch through constitutional order, weak formal 
institutions and rule of law, and subtle constitutional violations and maximum usage of 
constitutional loopholes.  
 The initial step to weaken the strength and independence of the Constitutional Courts 
was packing the Court with judges selected by the Fidesz government. First, the procedure 
for electing Constitutional Court judges was amended so that a single two-thirds 
Parliamentary vote can place a judge in the Court. Prior to the amendment, multiparty 
agreement was necessary for nominating a judge to the Court.86 Next, the Fidesz government 
increased the number of judges on the Court from 11 to 15, which allowed the government to 
pack the Court with judges of its choice. The Parliament also gave itself the authority to elect 
the Constitution Court’s president. This was previously the task of the Court’s judges to elect 
its president. These three acts occurred in the Fidesz government’s first year in power. Each 
placement of the new judges into the Court was done so without any opposition party 
influence. The Fidesz government selected nine out the fifteen judges in its first three years. 
Currently, only three sitting judges were appointed to the Court prior to 2010. As expected, 
the new judges in the Court have voted in unison with the Fidesz government’s position in 
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each case heard by the Court, with only a few exceptions.87 Only Justice István Stumpf has 
gone against party lines more than once even though he is a member of the Fidesz party. He 
has been ridiculed as a disloyal and traitorous party member.88  
 As the Court was in the process of being packed with Fidesz loyalists, it fought back 
against the government on a number of occasions. The first battle between the Fidesz 
government and the Constitutional Court was over a 98 percent retroactive tax against the 
severance payments paid to all state officials who left their posts after Jan. 1, 2010. It is 
likely that this tax was aimed at the officials from the previous government who were leaving 
office to make room for the new Fidesz appointees. The Court found this law to be 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto 
laws and the size of the tax was confiscatory.89 In retaliation, the government passed two 
constitutional amendments. The first amendment restricted the jurisdiction of the Court so it 
could generally no longer review any law that impacts fiscal or tax policy.90 The second 
reenacted the retroactive tax, extending the tax back five years. After the new retroactive 
severance tax went into effect, it was challenged before the Court again. The Court heard the 
case, despite the constitutional amendment that restricted its jurisdiction, and struck down the 
tax again.91 The Court bypassed its constitutional jurisdiction by claiming the tax violated 
                                                        
87 Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions 
Can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (with Special Reference to Hungary.” Transnational 
Law & Contemporary Problems 23 (2014). 
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91 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Oct. 5, 2011, MK.37/2011 (Hung.). 
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human dignity rather than being a fiscal matter.  However, the Fidesz government found a 
significant loophole in the Court’s decision.92 As the Court limited its judgment to 2005-
2010, which was prior the constitutional amendment restricting its jurisdiction, the Court 
acknowledged that the Parliament could restrict its jurisdiction going forward after passing 
the 2010 amendment.93 Therefore, the taxes levied on severance payments after the 
jurisdiction-limiting amendment that went into effect were constitutional.  
 Next, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the amendment restricting its powers 
on fiscal and tax laws. Unfortunately, the Court found that it did not have the powers to 
evaluate constitutional amendments for substantive unconstitutionality because the 
amendment was passed in a formally constitutional manner. Nevertheless, the Court 
chastised the Fidesz government for frequently amending the Constitution in its first year of 
office; these actions were prior to the enactment of the Fundamental Law.94 The three 
dissenting justices—András Bragyova, László Kiss, and Miklós Lévay—were all elected 
prior to 2010.  Former Chief Counsel to the President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
Gabor Halmai remarked, “the Court created a very bad precedent, the Majority of 
Constitutional Judges voluntarily signing the death sentence to judicial review.”95 
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 The next blow dealt to the Court’s judicial review powers was found in Fundamental 
Law, which became effective on Jan. 1, 2012. The Fundamental Law ended actio popularis 
and implemented a German-style constitutional complaint system. The German-style 
constitutional complaint process only allows those who are affected by an unconstitutional 
law to bring a complaint before the Court. It is rare that laws that involve institutional power 
and the structure of government institutions directly affect individuals in a manner that is not 
abstract. These abstract constitutional challenges can still be brought before the Court by 
ombudsmen, the President or 25 percent the members in Parliament. However, the current 
oppositional party division between the far left (the Socialists [MszP]) and the far right 
(Jobbik) make it unlikely that 25 percent of MPs will be able to organize a challenge. In 
addition, the Fidesz government eliminated of three of the four ombudsmen postions. 
Further, the President who is elected by MPs is not likely to challenge the current 
government on constitutional issues.  
 The first case to be brought before the Court under the new complaint system 
ironically involved the lowering of the retirement age for ordinary courts judges from 70 to 
62 on the day the Fundamental Law went into effect (Jan. 1, 2012). In one fell swoop, 10 
percent of the ordinary judiciary were forced to retire, including eight of the 20 court 
presidents at the county level and 20 of the 80 Kuria judges (Supreme Court). 96 Prior to the 
judicial retirement law, the Fidesz government suspended the usual procedure for electing 
judges from June 2011 to January 2012 until the Fundamental Law went into effect. The 
power to fill the empty seats was given to the newly elected President of the National Judicial 
Office Tünde Handó, who is wife of Jószef Szájer who infamously wrote much of the 
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Fundamental Law on his iPad. Several prematurely retired judges brought their cases before 
the Constitutional Court. On July 16, 2012, the Court ruled that lowering the retirement age 
was an arbitrary change in their status and violated the independence of the judges.97 
Dissenting opinions all came from justices elected by the Fidesz parliamentary 
supermajority: Justices Balsai, Dienes-Oehm, Svívós, Lenkovics and Szalay, Pokol and 
Stumpf. After the Court shot down this law, Prime Minister Orbán angrily said in a press 
conference, “the system is to stay,” despite the Court’s ruling that the law was 
unconstitutional.98 In response, the European Commission of the EU began to apply political 
pressure on the government and began an infringement procedure. The Fidesz government 
replied and changed the law so the retirement age became 65 and the retirement process 
would be over ten years, instead of retiring at 62 over a one-year process. Increasing the 
retirement process to ten years allowed many judges to work past the age of 65.   
 The next battle between the Fidesz government and Constitutional Court came after 
the Court ruled that parts of the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law were 
unconstitutional. The Fundamental Law referred to a list of laws called the Transitional 
Provisions that specified how to implement the new constitution, but its legal status was 
ambiguous from the start. The Transitional Provisions were passed in Parliament on Dec. 30, 
2011, and went into effect the same day the Fundamental Law went into effect on Jan. 1, 
2012. Parliament claimed the Transitional Provisions were amendments to the Fundamental 
Law. Parliament was trying to make amendments to the Fundamental Law before it even 
came into effect. The ombudsman who brought the challenge before the Court said 
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Parliament had not passed the Transitional Provisions as a constitutional amendment and 
could not be part of the constitution.99  
 The Court examined not only the formal Parliamentary procedure for amending the 
Fundamental Law but also reviewed the subject matter of what a constitutional amendment 
should be. All of the judges elected before the Fidesz government took power voted to strike 
the Provisions. At this time, seven of the 15 judges in the Court were appointed and elected 
by Fidesz, and they did not yet have a decisive majority. This is one of the occasions that 
Justice Stumpf voted against the government. The Court found that constitutional 
amendments must take proper form through direct incorporation into the constitution rather 
than laws and rules tacked onto the end of the constitution. Moreover, the Transitional 
Provisions could not be part of the Fundamental Law because the transitional nature of these 
laws only allows them to function during the transition period between constitutions. In 
addition to striking down the permanence of the Transitional Provisions, the Court also found 
that the Provisions could not regulate other topics and act as an “open gateway” to push 
through all kinds of permanent changes to the Fundamental Law without amending the 
constitutional text. 100  
The Court struck down all parts of provisions that were not transitional. This included 
the introduction of the Transition Provisions and its first four articles. The introduction 
condemned the pre-1989 communist regime run by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
(communist party) as a criminal organization and claimed the largest opposition to Fidesz in 
Parliament, the Socialist party (MszP), is the communist party’s successor. The Provisions 
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also removed statutes of limitations for ‘crimes’ committed during the communist era, and 
opened up the door to prosecute MszP members for these ‘crimes.’ Article 11(3)(4) allowed 
the head of the National Judicial Office to move cases from court to court at her discretion, 
and this power was also given to the Prosecutor General. There is a long list of laws thrown 
into the “open gateway” that were removed by the Court.101  
The battle over the Transitional Provisions did not end here. The Fidesz government 
reenacted all the components of the Transitional Provisions with the Fourth Amendment to 
the Fundamental Law. The Fourth Amendment struck a major blow to the Constitutional 
Court by nullifying all the decisions the Court made opposing the Fidesz government since 
the Fundamental Law became effective.102 The Court previously found that the Fundamental 
Law’s definition of the family was unduly narrow as it did not include same-sex partnerships 
and other non-canonical family formations,103 but the Fourth Amendment reinstated the 
requirement that “family ties shall be based on marriage and the relationship between parents 
and children.”104 The Court voided the law that that criminalized homelessness, but the 
Fourth Amendment reinstated this.105 The Court found the law that banned displaying 
extremist symbols, specifically the swastika and the Soviet red star, unconstitutional. The 
Fourth Amendment not only made speech against minorities illegal but also went a step 
further to ban hate speech against the Hungarian Nation.106 The Court ruled against the law 
that removed the legal status of more than 300 churches, which also gave Parliament the sole 
                                                        
101 See Transitional Provisions articles 12, 13, 18, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 31, and 32 for more laws 
found unconstitutional by the Court.  
102 Venice Commission, “Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary,” 95th Sess., CDL-
REF 014-e art.1 (2013).  
103 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] June 11, 2012, MK.43/2012 (Hung.). 
104 Venice Commission, “Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary,” 95th Sess., CDL-
REF 014-e art.1 (2013). 
105 Fourth Amendment, Art. 8. 
106 Fourth Amendment, Art. 5. 
 43 
power to determine official churches. The Amendment, however, gave this power back to 
Parliament as well as the additional power to recognize churches based on their willingness 
to participate in the state’s community goals.107 The last notable law reinstated by the 
Amendment is the campaign advertising law that bans parties from advertising in commercial 
broadcasts that the Court previously found unconstitutional.108 Not only did the Fourth 
Amendment reinstate these laws, but also, more importantly, it hamstrung the Court from 
continuing to challenge the government. Essentially, the Fourth Amendment was the final 
blow in the battle to eliminate the Court’s check against Parliament and the closely linked 
executive branch. The Amendment prohibited the Court from expanding beyond the scope of 
questions submitted for constitutional review; the Court’s review must be “closely related” to 
the question submitted.109 It also explicitly restricted the Court from substantively reviewing 
constitutional amendments for conflicts within the constitution, like the Court had done so 
with the Transitional Provisions. The Court can now only review amendment procedures.110 
The Fourth Amendment nullified all the decisions made by the Court in its 22-year history 
when the Fundamental Law went into effect.111 Prime Minister Obán and Fidesz government 
eliminated the primary check against it power. After the only substantial check against the 
Fidesz government’s consolidation of power by Constitutional Court was removed, the other 
weaker, informal checks were easily dismantled. 
The other formal institution that can act as a check against Parliament and the Prime 
Minister is the President of Hungary. Under the previous constitution, the president had veto 
powers to suspend a law and either send it back to Parliament for revision or send it to the 
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Constitutional Court for review. In 2010, instead of changing the laws regarding the 
president’s powers, the Fidesz government changed the person. Through parliamentary 
procedure, which went uncontested once again due to its supermajority, Fidesz elected the 
party’s former vice-chair Pál Schmitt as president. President Schmitt did not attempt to block 
any of the Parliament’s actions during his presidency.112 He stepped down in April 2012 due 
to a plagiarism scandal regarding his 1992 doctoral thesis, but he was replaced with Fidesz 
co-founder János Áder.  
 In July 2015, the Fidesz government passed an amendment to the Freedom of 
Information Act that decimated the former freedom of information guarantees in order for 
Fidesz to further conceal its actions, protect itself against corruption charges and protect the 
institutions that the government had established. Freedom of information “guarantees the 
transparency of the activities of public authorities and of the spending of public 
funds.”113 The amended Freedom of Information Act, which was signed by President Ader, 
allows public bodies to charge for “human labor costs.” Yet, it is unclear how much the 
public has to pay for “human labor costs.” Previously, the only charges for data requests 
came from the cost of copying documents. One provision of the bill allows public bodies to 
refuse data requests for ten years if the data was used in decision-making processes. This 
impedes any potential investigation into government spending by the public or civil society 
groups. The Fidesz government comprehensively blocked any checks against it from political 
institutions and the public. The next step Prime Minister Orbán and the Fidesz government 
take to ensure that they are not obstructed at any turn and entrench their power is packing 
informal institutions with loyalists. 
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 The European Union has done little to prevent Constitutional Court’s diminishing 
strength, independence, and power against the government’s consolidation. The EU only 
became involved when the retirement age of judges was lowered. But, the EU requested the 
Fidesz government to redress this matter on grounds of discrimination rather than violation 
of the Union’s principles of democracy. Further, the Fidesz government only partially 
complied with the European Union Court of Justice’s decision. The government 
compromised and extended the retirement age to 65. Moreover, the EU could have 
obstructed an essential component to authoritarianism by intervening when the Constitutional 
Court lost is independence and its formal check against the Fidesz government’s growing 
strength. 
Strong Public Institutions and Entrenching Future Power 
 As the Fidesz government was weakening formal institutions and their checks against 
its supermajority in Parliament, the government was also filling state and bureaucratic 
institutions with Fidesz loyalists and expanding the powers of these institutions. These 
institutions include the National Judicial Office, Budget Council, State Audit Office, Public 
Prosecutor, Media Authority and Council, and Election Commission. The Fidesz government 
has also created terms for these positions that can last several election cycles as well as 
remain in office for the unforeseeable future in many circumstances. The following section 
will address each of these institutions and how the Fidesz government has used them for 
authoritarian ends.  
The Constitutional Court was not the only part of the judiciary that lost its 
independence. Under the former Constitution, a panel of judges selected the lower-court 
judges. The Fundamental Law replaced this process when it established the National Judicial 
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Office (NJO). Parliament elected Tünde Handó, the wife of József Szájer, the infamous 
Fundamental Law drafter, as the president of the NJO. The NJO president is elected to a 
nine-year term; however, she can only be replaced after her term expires once Parliament has 
selected a candidate with a two-thirds vote. Therefore, Handó may be able to legally remain 
in office past her nine-year term if Parliament cannot muster a two-thirds majority to replace 
her. Even if the Fidesz party loses its majority in Parliament, the new majority would need to 
garner support for two-thirds vote to remove her. Fidesz government has implemented this 
same replacement rule for the head of all the informal institutions mentioned above. 
Indeed, this move to insert a Fidesz-friendly figure in the role of NJO president is 
highly consequential for the purposes of institutional control. The head of the NJO has the 
power to select new judges, promote and demote judges, begin disciplinary proceedings, and 
select court leaders. The NJO president chooses new judges from a list prepared by local 
judicial councils, but she creates the application process and can reject lists created by the 
councils and restart the process. The President of Hungary signs off on all judicial 
appointments, but the Fidesz appointed President is unlikely to reject appointment made by 
another Fidesz loyalist. The Fourth Amendment also gave the NJO president the authority to 
reassign cases to any court in Hungary. The best examples of this office working to the 
benefit of the Fidesz government occurred in February 2012. Handó reassigned a case 
involving a high-profile corruption case against MszP officials and another case that was an 
appeal to criminal corruption conviction against a Fidesz party member from a Budapest 
court to the countryside. Both decisions were favorable for the Fidesz government. Handó 
effectively has the power to decide which judge hears any case. 
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 The Fundamental Law created the Budget Council, which is comprised of three 
members. Two members are elected by a two-thirds vote in Parliament for six-year terms and 
the third member is appointed to a 12-year term by the President of Hungary. Fidesz loyalists 
were of course selected for these positions. The Budget Council can veto any budget 
proposed by Parliament if it adds even one forint (Hungarian currency) to the national debt. 
The Fundament Law provided the President with the power to dissolve Parliament and call 
for new elections if a budget is not agreed upon by March 31 of each year. Moreover, if 
Fidesz is in jeopardy of losing its power in Parliament to another party, this provision could 
thwart the oppositional party’s chance to take control of Parliament.  
 Under the new order of the Fundamental Law, the State Audit Office, which was 
formerly an incredibly strong and independent institution, has been given the power to 
investigate the alleged misuse of public funds. However, the former Fidesz MP who was 
elected to the 12-year term as head of the Office has no professional audit training.114 Similar 
loyalist-packing took place in other key state bureaucratic institutions as well. The head of 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Péter Polt, was nominated in 2010 by President Schmitt and 
elected by a two-thirds vote in Parliament. Polt became a Fidesz member in 1993 and ran for 
a Parliamentary mandate in 1994, which he lost. The number of ombudsmen has been 
reduced from four to one. Formerly in Hungary, ombudsmen had their own office, staff and 
jurisdiction to monitor certain human rights areas. The new regime only has one ombudsman 
who has two deputies and the staff has been greatly reduced. Specifically, the data-protection 
ombudsman’s office was removed, and this authority was consolidated into the government 
and its independence has been abolished. 
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 The National Election Commission (NEC) is comprised of seven members that are 
appointed by the President and elected with a two-thirds vote from Parliament. As with the 
NJO and the Budget Council, among others discussed above, each NEC commissioner is a 
Fidesz loyalist. NEC commissioners are elected to nine-year term but remain in office if 
Parliament cannot garner a two-thirds vote to replace the commissioners once their term has 
expired. The NEC is responsible for overseeing that election laws are followed, deciding on 
complaints, and administering final results. Fidesz control over the NEC provided Fidesz 
incumbents with tremendous advantages over challengers during the 2014 election. The 
commission’s seemingly unlimited term will provide Fidesz incumbents with advantages 
over challengers in the future. 
 Hungary’s media regulatory body includes the Media Authority and the Media 
Council. The Media Authority is hierarchically superior to the Media Council, and it consists 
of three elements: the President of the Authority, the Media Council, and the Office of the 
Media Council. The President of the Authority is appointed by the President of Hungary after 
being nominated by the Prime Minister and serves a nine-year term. The Fidesz government 
selected former Fidesz MP Annamária Szalai as the Media Authority’s President. The Media 
Law created the system so the President of the Media Authority is also the Chairperson of the 
Media Council. The President-Chairperson has the sole power to appoint positions in these 
bodies, and Szalai appointed Fidesz loyalists to key positions. Per usual, the President-
Chairperson can remain in office after the term expires until Parliament musters a two-thirds 
majority to elect a replacement.  
 In addition to packing state institutions and expanding their roles, cardinal laws have 
entrenched the Fidesz agenda into future governance, whether or not the Fidesz party has a 
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majority in Parliament. Cardinal laws in Hungary are those passed by Parliament that require 
a relative two-thirds vote to pass as well amend. 115 In order to enact or amend the cardinal, 
there must be an absolute majority. Therefore, cardinal laws have become entrenched in legal 
code almost as much as the Fundamental Law due to the high standard to overturn these 
laws. The Fidesz government with its supermajority has been able to pass cardinal laws at 
will since 2010. These laws will remain in the legal code until a new party earns a 
supermajority in Parliament or is able to build a two-thirds coalition.  
 Packing informal institutions with loyalists is a vital component for constructing a 
stealth authoritarian government. These public institutions typically regulate government 
activity and can provoke legal actions for violations. These institutions also ensure that the 
political playing field is level. By packing informal institutions with loyalists, the Fidesz 
government has used these institutions to shelter itself from regulation and has provided the 
party with great advantages over opposing parties that may present serious challenges against 
the Fidesz government in the future. Further, the Fidesz government has entrenched its 
authority into informal institutions with the seemingly unlimited terms and replacement 
procedures for officials that a new government would have difficulty passing without a 
supermajority. Packing informal institutions with loyalists further entrenches Fidesz 
government’s institutional power. 
Controlling the Media 
Stealth authoritarianism relies on controlling the media to block dissent, promote self-
censorship in journalists, and as an advantage for elections. The Fidesz government passed 
legislation and packed institutions to gain control over the media. In 2010, Parliament passed 
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two laws to regulate media: the Media Act and the Press Act, which are commonly referred 
together as the Media Laws. 116 While the Media Act restructured the media regulatory 
system by creating the Media Council and the Media Authority, the Press Act involved 
media content and press regulation—both of these Acts are cardinal laws. The Media Laws 
damage freedom of expression, media pluralism, and press independence.117 The new laws 
provided the Media Authority and Council with tremendous amounts of power. In addition to 
the Media Laws, Parliament passed a progressive tax on advertising revenue for media. The 
Council of Europe’s Venice Commission commented on the Media Laws that, “[t]he three 
legal texts under examination are extremely lengthy, complex and regulate virtually every 
aspect of the media sphere.”118 
The Media Laws use vague language that provides the Media Authority and the 
Media Council with the legal ambiguity to facilitate arbitrary application of the law. For 
example, Article 16 of the Press Act prohibits media content that violates “constitutional 
order.” Throughout the Media Laws, the same vague language for illegal speech applies to 
minorities,119 religion and political beliefs,120 and nearly every other category of speech. 
Furthermore, the regulatory bodies do not have a set of guidelines for interpretation of illegal 
content and application of sanctions.  
The Media Act provides a variety of sanctions to media outlets, including fines, 
suspensions of the outlet’s operations, deletion of the outlet from the media register or 
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termination of the public contract on broadcasting services. 121 The maximum fine for a 
media service provider with ‘significant market power’ is 200 million HUF (approximately 
$724,000 USD), and the maximum fine for online media is 25 million HUF (approximately 
$90,000 USD). Court proceedings do not have a suspensive effect on these fines as the 
Media Council collects them regardless of a pending challenge in court.122 These large fines 
have led journalists and media outlets to self-censor in fear that their outlet will not be able to 
survive economically if they receive a large fine. The fact that the Fidesz Parliament elected 
the members of the Media Council and the Media Authority increases the likelihood of self-
censorship. The result has been limited dissent and critique of the Fidesz government. 
The Media Laws also require “balanced” coverage.123 Balanced coverage requires 
news programs to clearly distinguish between facts and opinions.124 Once again, the term 
balanced is incredibly vague and subjective. Requiring balanced coverage seems like 
respectable request, but facts should be comprehensive and accurate rather than balanced. It 
can be nearly impossible to separate fact from opinion in countless situations. For public 
media services, the National News Agency (NNA) selects the news materials, and NNA is 
the only authorized provider for public media.125 The Media Council Chairperson selects the 
NNA director. Accordingly, well-informed or educated Hungarians with access to multiple 
media sources consider public media services to be the mouthpiece for the Fidesz 
government.126 However, many Hungarians living outside of Budapest in the countryside 
either do not have access to Internet and other media sources or cannot afford media service 
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subscriptions. So, the only news that many rural Hungarians receive is public news. This is a 
sizeable population considering that 30 percent Hungarians live in rural areas.127 Rural 
Hungarians do not have access to multiple sources of information and points of view. The 
lack of information is dangerous and partially a reason why rural Hungarians have supported 
the Fidesz party despite its authoritarian practices. 
In another attempt to prevent diverse perspectives into Hungary, the Fidesz 
government created a new advertisement tax for media outlets. This tax, however, was only 
created to tackle one media outlet; this just so happens that this media outlet is the largest in 
Hungary. On June 11, 2014, Parliament passed Act XXII on Advertisement Tax to create a 
new progressive tax on media outlet’s advertising revenues. The taxation levels increase 
based off an outlet’s net revenue, and the highest rate is set a 50 percent for outlets with 
revenues exceeding 2 billion HUF.128 There is only one media outlet in Hungary, however, 
that exceeds 2 billion HUF: the Luxembourg-based RTL Group, which is owned by Europe’s 
largest media corporation, Bertelsmann.  
Stealth authoritarian regimes attempt to control information and block dissent of their 
authoritarian policies by controlling the media. Media control provides stealth authoritarian 
regimes influence over the information received by voters. The Hungarian government has 
blocked the public from accessing information and arguments from all sides of the political 
spectrum. Freedom of the media is an essential democratic tool that provides the public with 
necessary information for local and national debates that is necessary for votes to be 
informed. The hefty fines issued through arbitrary Media Council decisions have prevented 
national reporters from providing information to the public. The lack of information was 
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apparent in the 2014 election and exacerbated by undue advantages that new election and 
campaign laws provided to Fidesz incumbents. 
Ruling-Party Turnover: Election Laws and Incumbent Advantages 
 Elections and the possibility electoral turnover are vital elements of democracy. 
Electoral turnover allows the electoral process to respond to electoral preferences as well as 
proves that the incumbent can lose his or her seat.129 Stealth authoritarian governments 
provide the image that they have free and fair elections, but the outcomes are almost always 
predetermined in the favor of the authoritarian party incumbents. These regimes will 
reconfigure nearly every factor of an election to ensure that the current regime remains in 
power. For instance, stealth authoritarian regimes often reconfigure the number legislative 
seats, rules for counting votes, gerrymander, and rewrite campaign laws. All of these small 
advantages working in unison provide the current regime with nearly insurmountable 
advantages in elections. 
As previously discussed, the disproportionate electoral law gave the Fidesz party 68 
percent of seats in Parliament with 53 percent of the popular vote. In 2014, the Fidesz party 
retained its supermajority with only 44 percent of the vote. During this Fidesz government’s 
first four years in power, it passed a series of laws that would ensure that the Fidesz 
government would retain its supermajority. Despite losing its supermajority by one seat in 
2015 due to a special election held to replace a Fidesz MP after he was elected to the 
European Commission, the laws effectively guaranteed the party held onto its supermajority 
in 2014. Loss of its supermajority by one seat has still hardly prevented the Fidesz 
government from acting as it pleases. It is nearly predetermined that the Fidesz government 
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will find a way to regain its full supermajority in 2018, barring drastic changes to the current 
regime, which do not appear likely.  
 One of the first acts the Fidesz government made after it gained power in 2010 was to 
take control of the Election Commission. Parliament prematurely terminated the mandates of 
Election Commission members who were elected through 2014. Formerly, five seats were 
filled by a delegate from each party in Parliament while the other five members were filled 
through mutual agreements made between the governing and opposition parties. The Fidesz 
party filled all the seats not held by its delegates with Fidesz members. The Election 
Commission also has the power to block referendums, which weakened civil society’s ability 
to challenge the government. This was the first step to ensure that the 2014 elections results 
went in the favor of Fidesz incumbents. 
 On the surface, the 2014 election appeared to be in line with European democratic 
election standards. Voters were provided with a diverse option of candidates and votes were 
recorded accurately. The Fidesz party, however, enjoyed undue advantages.130 These 
advantages were created through election conduct regulated by the Fundamental Law, the 
Act on Elections of All Members of Parliament (Election Act), and the Act on Election 
Procedures (Election Procedures Act). First, the new election system reduced the number of 
seats from 386 to 199, and the method of seat distribution was changed. Out of the 199 seats, 
106 seats are decided through constituency districts in a one-round majority wins election. 
The other 93 seats are allocated through a proportional system that is based off the national 
popular vote for parties that break the 5 percent threshold.131 Under the previous electoral 
system, unused votes from the district contests were allocated to the proportional contest 
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based off the national vote. The new electoral system added the surplus votes from a winning 
candidate in the district contest were also added to the proportional contest. This led to six 
extra seats for the Fidesz-KNDP coalition.132 The reduction of seats also required redrawing 
district lines. Redrawing district lines have been criticized by both the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
for its lack of transparency, independence and consultation, and as gerrymandering.133 In 
addition, the district lines created through the Electoral Act were created as a cardinal law 
and require a two-thirds majority to change the constituency lines. This tremendously 
reduces the chances of a opposition party winning a majority in Parliament. 
As for the campaign process, OSCE found the Fidesz incumbents “ enjoyed an undue 
advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign 
activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State.”134 New media 
laws and campaign advertising laws also provided Fidesz incumbents with an unfair 
advantage over opposition candidates. The lack of critical reporting due to self-censorship 
caused by the threat of substantial fines was exacerbated by the lack of independence in 
public media, as previously discussed. The Fifth Amendment of the Fundamental Law passed 
in September 2013 amended the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on political advertisements 
after being pressured by European institutions to do so. However, the results were the same 
even after the amendment. The Fourth Amendment only allowed political advertisements in 
mass media if they were aired during the specified electoral campaign time period, in public 
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service mass media, and for free. The Fifth Amendment allowed private mass media to show 
political ads, but only during the campaign period and for free of charge. During the 2014 
election, none of the Hungarian private broadcasters chose to provide free airtime for 
campaign ads because of the current economic crisis in Hungary’s media industry.135 The 
total lack of ads aired on private broadcasts deprived audiences and voters from a variety of 
political messages.  
Campaigns were nearly indiscernible in rural areas, and there was no clear separation 
between the Fidesz political party and the government in terms of the campaign 
advertisements used. The Fidesz incumbents took advantage of an uneven playing field when 
the Fidesz party used the same slogan as a government campaign, “Hungary is performing 
better,” that continued to be aired on private broadcasts. This campaign was produced over a 
year prior to the election, and the rights were sold to the Fidesz party after it aired a 
remarkably similar campaign ad. OSCE found this to be a clear violation of separation 
between state and political party for election campaigns.136 The Media Council did not make 
any decisions for “balanced coverage” violations even though there were complaints filed. If 
examined independently, the electoral and campaign laws may appear to have had 
inconsequential or only minor impacts on the elections. But the comprehensive examination 
the interactive effects of the all the laws provide Fidesz incumbents with tremendous 
advantages over opponents and ensured their supermajority in Parliament remained intact. 
These laws and any future election laws should be analyzed after the 2018 election.  
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Strength of Civil Society  
Civil society organizations are one of the last lines of defense against authoritarian 
and violations of freedoms. Civil society groups have the ability to exposure stealth 
authoritarian regimes to international actors. Essentially, civil society can turn a stealth 
authoritarian regime into simply an authoritarian regime. Civil society generally acts as a 
watchdog over government actions and an informal check against the government. Stealth 
authoritarian regimes weakened civil society’s governance role in various ways, like 
intimidation or removing its influence in legislative processes. In some countries civil society 
groups may have only a small presence, which stealth authoritarian regimes find ideal. The 
Fidesz government found the best way to weaken civil society’s presence in Hungary was 
through verbal attacks and violent intimidation. 
In 2014, Prime Minister Orbán and other high-level government officials began to 
accuse NGOs of being “political activists…paid by foreign interest groups.”137 Prime 
Minister Orbán used these accusations to issue audits of 59 NGOs. The Government Control 
Office carried out these audits. The Governmental Control Office’s legal authority to conduct 
these audits is “seriously contested.”138 The primary dispute involves the European Economic 
Area/Norway Grant NGO Fund, which is an important funder for NGOs that focus on human 
rights, women’s rights, LGBT rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption. In 
August 2014, a criminal investigation was opened on NGOs connected with the Fund for 
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allegedly committing financial crimes by contributing to political parties. In September of 
that year, Ökotárs and DemNet—two NGOs funded by EEA/Norway grants—were raided. 
The police seized their computers, servers and documents. Even worse, officers raided the 
homes of NGO workers, searching the workers and seizing their computers.139 Four NGOs 
were sanctioned in December 2014 for not cooperating with the audit that resulted in 
suspension of their tax registration numbers.  
There are larger implications for the assault on civil society. While civil society 
groups are being pressured with sanctions and closures, the real problem in Fidesz’s attacks 
on civil society is the limitation of freedom of association. After the raids, many NGOs were 
deemed as toxic by government accusations and media reports. The negative image placed 
upon these NGOs has led to loss of potential funders, clients and collaborators, and even 
lawyers to represent them caused by fear of government attacks. 140  Moreover, as much of 
the media has been forced to self-censor, civil society groups act as one of the few 
independent voices able to offer to dissent and critique of the Fidesz government. As a result 
of these direct attacks to civil society, the viability of publicly challenging government 
policies and laws was dealt a substantial blow. 
The ability to use referendums as challenges against the government was also 
undermined. The Fidesz government packed the Election Commission with its party 
members. The Election Commission was given the power to block referendums. A key 
function of civil society’s role in national democracies is to bolster transparent governance 
and challenge government policies that violate human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
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democracy and rule of law—whether these alleged violations pertain to domestic or 
international law. In Hungary, referendums that are conducted through popular votes are a 
vital tool for civil society to derail any government policies that violate human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, democracy and rule of law. The Election Commission’s power to 
arbitrarily block referendums potentially eliminates civil society’s role to check the 
government. Decisions made by the Commission can be appealed to the Constitutional Court. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Commission’s decisions will be overturned due to the 
lack of independence of the Constitutional Court.  
Conclusions 
 The Fidesz government has successfully built a stealth authoritarian government. In 
its authoritarian reversal, this regime has used stealth authoritarian tactics as it worked 
through democratic channels, or at least the façade of democratic channels, such 
constitutional amendments, constitutional drafting process, judicial and institutional 
appointments and elections. The Fidesz government has methodically consolidated power 
into the hands of Prime Minister Orbán. The principle tool for this government has been its 
supermajority in Parliament. Despite the presence of multiple parties, the Fidesz government 
has constructed a single-party state. Initially, the Fidesz supermajority in Parliament was a 
legitimate choice made by the electorate in 2010. However, the Fidesz government has used 
this authority for undemocratic ends and has abolished all oppositional debate and input in 
governance.  
Democratic pillars have been torn down for authoritarian ones. Nearly all checks 
against the government have been removed. The government dismantled the Constitutional 
Court’s power to check Parliament and the executive branch. The Fidesz government did so 
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by removing the independence of the Court and eradicating its judicial review powers that 
could obstruct the executive branch’s consolidation of power. Informal public institutions 
were given additional powers and packed with Fidesz loyalists for with open-ended term 
limits. The public institutions no longer operated with the public’s interest in mind. Rather, 
they function in accordance with Fidesz rule. The demanding procedure to amend Cardinal 
Laws has also entrenched this government’s rule and policies for the unforeseeable future. 
Media laws and regulatory bodies have silenced media dissent and critique of the 
government. The lack of information has had spilled over into elections and campaigns. 
Election and campaign laws have nearly assured that the Fidesz government will be able to 
withstand electoral processes and remain in power. Finally, this regime has both legally and 
physically attacked entities representing civil society, obstructed civil society groups ability 
to access information of government activities and spending, and grasped control over 
referendums.  
Each of these actions viewed independently might cause one to believe that these are 
isolated instances violating democratic principles and rule of law. Prime Minister Orbán and 
his government have consciously made each of these actions with greater intentions of 
building an authoritarian government. EU institutions have weighed the Fidesz government’s 
actions in this independent fashion. This is a principal reason for the EU’s inaction and 
inability to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian reversal. The EU has hardly acknowledged these 
actions and has only intervened in a few instances. Regardless, the EU has been unable to 
alter the authoritarian path of the Fidesz government and protect its democratic values found 
in Article 2.  
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Case Study: Romania 
In July 2012, it appeared that Prime Minister Victor Ponta was going to take Romania 
down the same path towards authoritarianism as Hungary. Prime Minister Ponta and his 
center-left Social Liberal Union (USL) Government instituted emergency ordinances—even 
in the absence of legitimate emergency—that resulted in replacing the Speakers of both 
Parliamentary Chambers, firing the ombudsman, prohibiting the Constitutional Court from 
reviewing Parliament’s actions, and threatening the Court’s judges with impeachment. As 
democracy and rule of law were being violated, Prime Minister Ponta and the Parliament 
were in the process of impeaching President Traian Basescu. The means of the Ponta 
Government’s consolidation of power draw comparisons to the Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz 
government; however, the end results were far different. Ultimately, the Ponta Government 
was thwarted by Romania’s Constitutional Court and pressures from the EU. The Ponta 
Government in Romania has employed several similar stealth authoritarian tactics used by 
the Fidesz government in Hungary. Nonetheless, Romania has not experienced an 
authoritarian reversal. Political turmoil and consistent ruling party changes have prevented a 
single faction from gaining a foothold strong enough for an authoritarian. In addition, the 
extra checks in the structure of Romania’s government, in comparison to Hungary, have 
played a consequential role. This section will demonstrate that certain elements of stealth 
authoritarianism must be present for others to be achieved. 
 





The Romanian government has been a perpetual violator of democratic principles and 
rule of law, even after its accession into the European Union in 2007. The complexity of 
Romania’s government structure (as shown in Figure 2) in comparison to Hungary has 
prevented a single leader or political party to consolidate power and thoroughly entrench 
itself into government structures for the long haul. Political turmoil has also been a crucial 
factor in preventing a single faction for gaining tremendous amounts of power. Much of the 
political turmoil has been caused by the poor condition of Romania’s economy and the 
austerity measures that followed the 2008 global economic crisis, but public protests have 
also led to several Prime Minister resignations. 
In contrast to Hungary, the President’s Office in Romania is a strong check against 
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communist leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, who was later executed when the Soviet-supported 
communist regime fell in Romania in 1989. Ceausescu created a full-blown executive 
presidency in 1974 by raising the status of the president of the State Council. The executive 
branch is divided into two sections: the President and the Government. The Government 
refers to Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet of Ministers and the majority party or coalition in 
Parliament. Unlike the ceremonial President of Hungary, the President of Romania has far 
greater powers that are similar powers to the President of the United States. The Romanian 
President is Commander-in-Chief over the armed forces. The president has power to veto 
legislation, grant pardons, institute states of emergency, dissolve Parliament, and call on 
Parliament for referendums. The President is elected to five-year terms and can serve only 
two terms. The President also is responsible for nominating a Prime Minister candidate from 
the majority party or coalition when the Government has a change in power, which then goes 
to Parliament for a vote. The President can also be impeached for severe violations of the 
Constitution. Presidential impeachment processes have greatly affected Romanian politics in 
the past decade. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of Soviet-
occupation in Romania, the country drafted and adopted the 1991 Constitution to mark its 
transition to democracy. In 2003, several revisions were made to the 1991 Constitution for 
Romania’s integration into the European Union. The amended Constitution was adopted 
through a referendum that took place on October 18, 2003. Despite opposition and NGO 
allegations that the vote was rigged, the amendments came into force ten days later. The 
points of contention by these groups were over the voter turnout and the results. The 
minimum referendum threshold of 51 percent of eligible voters was barely met, as there was 
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a 55 percent turnout. Also, the final tally was 91 percent in favor and 9 percent opposed to 
the amendments. The massive margin of victory raised suspicions. Neither of these claims 
has been substantiated nor have they been brought to court. The referendum process in 
Romania over the next decade would be a major point of contention. 
Table 2: Stealth Authoritarian Indicators 
Emergency Ordinances Emergency Ordinances 
Strength of the Judiciary141 Moderate 
Strength of Formal Institutions and 
Government Checks 
Emergency Ordinances 
Informal Institutions Difficult to Pack due to frequent Government 
changes 
Control over Mass Media Control is Not Centralized, but media often 
suffers from a lack of independence 
Strength of Civil Society Historically Weak and Underfunded 
 
Use of Law and Constitutional Loopholes for Executive Branch Consolidation 
 Since Victor Ponta was appointed as Prime Minister in 2012, Ponta has had two 
primary objectives. First, Prime Minister Ponta was determined to impeach President Traian 
Basescu, who was the man who nominated him as Prime Minister. Second, he sought to 
weaken the Constitutional Court’s judicial review power over Parliament’s actions. Prime 
Minister Ponta, however, has not been the only Prime Minister to attempt to replace the 
President as well as undermine the judiciary. Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu also 
attempted to impeach President Basescu in 2007.  While the Fidesz government’s 
consolidation power comes form its Parliamentary supermajority, the Romanian 
Government’s consolidation power comes from issuing emergency ordinances. Emergency 
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ordinances allow the Government to bypass Parliament and implement law, which are known 
as legislative delegation power. 
Article 115 of the Constitution specifies two types of government ordinances. First, 
paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 115 provides legislative delegation powers to the Government: 
(1) Parliament may pass a special law enabling the Government to issue ordinances in 
fields outside the scope of organic laws. (2) The enabling law shall compulsorily 
establish the field and the date up to which ordinances may be issued. (3) If the 
establishing law so requests, ordinances shall be submitted to Parliament for 
approval, according to the legislative procedure, until the expiry of the enabling time 
limit. Non-compliance with the term entails discontinuation of the effects of the 
ordinance.142  
 
These three paragraphs give the Government the authority to issue laws outside the scope of 
organic laws. Organic laws in Romania are similar to cardinal laws in Hungary. Organic laws 
regulate areas of higher importance to Romania than ordinary laws. Organic laws address 
national borders, citizenship, organization of Government bodies, political parties, and 
organization and functioning of the courts. Organic laws are also similar to cardinal laws in 
that they require higher standards for amending or enacting as compared to ordinary laws. 
The hierarchy of laws in Romania starts with ordinary laws at the bottom, then organic laws, 
then constitutional laws at the top with the highest authority.  
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Second, paragraphs 4 to 8 of Article 115 allows the Government to adopt emergency 
ordinances without a delegation from Parliament.143 Paragraph 4 states that “[t]he 
Government can only adopt emergency ordinances in exceptional cases, the regulation of 
which cannot be postponed, and have the obligation to give the reasons for the emergency 
status within their contents.” It appears, however, that the Government’s frequent use of 
emergency ordinances indicates abuse of this mechanism. Since 2000, there has consistently 
been over 100 emergency ordinances issued annually and in several years there have been 
over 200 issued. The emergency ordinance procedure allows these ordinances to remain in 
force unless the second and deciding Chamber of Parliament explicitly rejects it. The 
Parliamentary majority can keep the emergency ordinance in force by delaying the vote in 
the two Chambers in Parliament. This has been the cause of government abuses as well as 
such a high frequency of emergency ordinances issued in recent years. 
Article 115 does place two specific limitations on emergency ordinances. Paragraph 6 
does not allow these ordinances to pertain to constitutional laws, fundamental State 
institutions, rights or freedoms set forth in the Constitution, electoral rights, nor forcible 
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transfer of assets into public property. The second limitation stems from the reference to 
organic law quorum procedure found in paragraph 5. Article 76(1) requires a higher quorum 
procedure for organic laws where there must be an absolute majority in each Chamber rather 
than a relative majority used for ordinary laws. Moreover, a strong and independent 
Constitutional Court is crucial to prevent the Government’s abuse of emergency ordinances. 
Strength of the Judiciary   
 The Constitutional Court was an incredibly weak institution and did not play much of 
a role in the democratization process throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The Romanian 
Constitutional Court was the only court of the same stature in the region that did not have 
final arbiter powers over constitutional matters—the Polish Constitutional Tribunal also did 
not have final arbiter status until 1997. Article 145 of the 1991 allowed the Court’s decisions 
to be overruled by a two-thirds vote in Parliament. Parliament would rarely consider the 
Court’s decisions as mandatory.144 The Court also did not have the jurisdiction to settle 
conflicts between public institutions. Parliament had decision-making supremacy over all 
constitutional matters for over a decade during Romania’s democratic transition. It was not 
until the 2003 constitutional amendments that the Constitutional Court began to reflect those 
of the same authority throughout the European Union. Romania altered the Constitution to 
bring the Court’s powers in line with EU norms and requirements for accession. Most 
importantly, the amendments removed Parliaments ability to override Constitutional Court 
decisions. Not only did the Court begin to decide on constitutional matters, but also the 
nature of its legitimacy elicited political debates that began to consider constitutional 
boundaries. This was a novel concept in Romania since liberal democracy and 
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constitutionalism were relatively new in the transitioning state. On several occasions, the 
Court has showed its strength and stood up against the Government’s misuse of power.  
The Court began to establish itself through a series a constitutional crises that began 
as the incumbent National Liberal Government started the impeachment process of President 
Basescu in 2007. The Prime Minister at the time, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, and his 
Government began the impeachment process for charges alleging unconstitutional 
presidential activism and involvement in inner-party struggles. Parliament voted to suspend 
President Basescu. Article 95(1) of the Constitution states that presidential impeachments can 
only result from “grave acts infringing upon Constitutional provisions.”  In an advisory 
opinion, the Court ruled that the acts committed by President Basescu could not be 
considered “grave.”145 This advisory opinion, however, was not needed because 75 percent 
of votes cast in the referendum (the final impeachment step) were in opposition of the 
impeachment. Basescu was reinstated as President after his 30-day suspension. Furthermore, 
the Court established its presence and likely would have overturned the impeachment had 
President Basescu not won the referendum. 
 Another impeachment attempt of President Basescu took place in 2012, this time by 
Prime Minister Victor Ponta and his USL Government. The impeachment attempt occurred 
in multiple stages and involved legal maneuvering by the Government. The first step was an 
attempt to remove the Constitutional Court’s review powers. On July 4, 2012, the Romanian 
Government issued an emergency ordinance to eliminate the Constitutional Court’s power to 
check the constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament.146 The ordinance amended Article 
27(1) of Law 47/1992 on the Organisation and Operation of the Constitutional Court.  In 
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June 2012, 67 MPs challenged the constitutionality of a law that amended that same Article. 
Due to this pending challenge before the Constitutional Court, the law did not come into 
force. Yet, the adoption of the emergency ordinance, which had the exact same content as the 
challenged law, removed the Court’s ability to review the law. The Constitutional Court 
pushed back against the Government emergency ordinance. The Court ruled on July 9 that 
the law to amend Article 27(1) was unconstitutional, the adoption of the emergency 
ordinance was unconstitutional, and the Government behavior was abusive towards to 
Court.147  
 The Government issued another emergency ordinance the following day—July 5, 
2012. The ordinance amended referendum procedures in Article 10 of Law No.3/2000 on the 
Organisation of the Referendum.148 This emergency ordinance eliminated the 51 percent 
voter turnout requirement for presidential impeachment referendums. The emergency 
ordinance lowered the bar for impeachment referendums: “the dismissal of the President of 
Romania is approved if it meets the majority of valid votes of the citizens that took part in the 
referendum.”149 The Court ruled against the amendment and required that presidential 
impeachment referenda require that the President’s removal from office must met the same 
standard that he or she is elected, 51 percent of the population must participate for the vote to 
be valid.150 
While the Ponta Government was attempting to amend to impeachment process, it 
just so happened that Parliament was in the process of suspending President Basescu for 
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allegedly overstepping his powers with illegal phone taps, using security forces against 
political enemies and pressuring prosecutors in criminal cases. Parliament voted on July 6, 
2012, to suspend President Basescu for 30 days. While Prime Minister Ponta was attempting 
to impeach President Basescu in July 2012, he also removed the speakers of both Chambers 
of Parliament and replaced them with political allies. Ponta also replaced the Ombudsman 
with one of his choosing. According to Article 98 of the Constitution, after the President is 
suspended, the Speaker of the Senate and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies become 
the interim President until the impeachment referendum is organized. Given both the 
Speakers were members of parties that supported President Basescu, Parliament removed the 
Speakers and replaced them with political allies. The Ombudsman has the authority to 
challenge emergency ordinances issued by the Government. Therefore, he was removed from 
office, and replaced with a new ombudsman who did not challenge any emergency ordinance 
issued during this period.  
Moreover, Prime Minister Ponta and Parliament were changing the rules of 
impeachment while the process had already begun. The impeachment referendum took place 
on July 29, and nearly 90 percent of the votes cast were in favor of impeaching Basescu. 
However, the 51 percent quorum was not met because only 46 percent of eligible voters 
participated in the referendum. On August 21, 2012, the Constitutional Court made its 
decision on the impeachment. The Court found the referendum to be void, because it did not 
meet the required quorum. In a game of tug of war, the Government also chose to selectively 
publish Court decisions in the Official Gazette, which ultimately made the decision 
ineffective. Romanian court decisions are not effective and binding until they have been 
published in the Official Gazette. The decision was later published after the European 
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Commission chastised the Government. President Basescu was re-installed back into office, 
and ultimately the Ponta Government accepted the Court’s decision.151  
 Not from a lack of effort, the Ponta Government has been unable to consolidate 
power and remove the Constitutional Court’s judicial review powers. In contrast to the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, there has been no restructuring of the Court or changes in 
appointment procedures.  The Court is comprised of nine justices that serve nine-year terms 
that cannot be prolonged or renewed. Three justices are appointed by the Chamber of 
Deputies, three by the Senate and three by the President. The Constitutional Court renews 
three justices every three years. The Court’s organization laws carefully safeguard its 
independence and prevent packing the Court by a particular branch.  
 The ordinary courts in Romania—the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Superior 
Court of Magistry, Court of Appeals, the Tribunal Courts, and Courts of First Instance—have 
not endured the same independence. Several judges in these courts have been charged and 
convicted of corruption. Romania’s accession into the EU came with the Union’s 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) that monitors the Member State’s progress. 
A primary CVM focus has been the rampant corruption in Romania. Public official 
corruption is monitored and investigated by National Anticorruption Directorate. Despite 
debates about the effectiveness and independence of courts in corruption cases, hundreds of 
public officials and several judges have been convicted of corruption. Even Prime Minister 
Ponta is not immune from corruption investigations. In July 2015, Ponta was charged with 
corruption for allegedly committing fraud, tax evasion and money laundering dating back to 
his time as a lawyer before he became Prime Minister in 2012. He is the first Prime Minister 
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to stand trial while in office.152 Corruption trials are slow moving in Romania; the trial is 
currently in progress, as of October 2015.  
On October 30, 2015, a fire broke out in a Bucharest nightclub during a performance 
by a local band. The fire killed 56 people and hundreds were injured.153 A wave of protests 
broke out in Bucharest—a some of which were the largest since the fall of communism in 
1989—that charged the government with corruption, inaction and ineptitude in the wake of 
the tragedy. Protesters accused the government of being too lax in issuing permits and failing 
to sufficiently inspect public venues. 154 As a result of the protest, Prime Minister Ponta 
resigned on November 4, 2015. In his resignation statement, Ponta said, “I have the 
obligation to acknowledge that there is legitimate anger in society. In my years as a 
politician, I put up a fight in any battle with political opponents. However, I won’t put up a 
fight against the people.”155 Ponta’s Cabinet was replaced two weeks later, and Parliament 
elected Dacian Ciolos, a political independent, as Prime Minister. 
Prime Minister Ponta was unable to establish a key component of stealth 
authoritarian—consolidation of power into the executive branch and removal of formal 
checks from other branches of government. The Constitutional Court maintained its strength 
and independence to prevent this from occurring. From this point, a stealth authoritarian 
regime will face severe difficulties to establish the other components of authoritarianism. The 
regime will likely be unable to pack informal institutions without contestations, ensure the 
regime maintains its power through elections, and control the media. These components have 
also been obstructed by political turmoil and consistent regime changes in Romania. Despite 
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a legitimate authoritarian challenge in Romania, the current situation shows its democratic 
deficits and vulnerability of an authoritarian reversal. 
Ruling-Party Turnover and Packing Public Institutions with Loyalists 
Political turmoil and frequent regime changes in Romania has not allowed political 
elites to thoroughly pack public institutions with loyalists. Prime Minister Ponta and his 
Government have challenged democratic principles and rule of law, but the Government has 
not successfully consolidated power in the executive branch. The has been, in part, caused 
strength and independence of the Constitutional Court, checks from the Presidency and the 
opposition party checks in Parliament. The inability for any government faction to 
consolidate power in Romanian politics has been affected by political turmoil. The nightclub 
fire protests and Ponta’s resignation are the most recent examples of political turbulence. 
Political stability in Romania has been incredibly volatile in recent years. Political 
turmoil has been partially caused by the recent crackdown on corruption, but much the 
turmoil has been caused by economic instability. There were three Governments in 2012. 
Prime Minister Emil Boc (Democratic Liberal Party) and his cabinet resigned in February 
2012 following weeks of protests against austerity measures and surviving several votes of 
no confidence. In April 2012, Prime Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu’s Government was 
forced out of office after a vote of no confidence in Parliament. President Basescu then 
appointed Social Democrat Victor Ponta as interim Prime Minister, who was later voted into 
office when the Social Democratic Party and its coalition won the Parliamentary majority in 
December 2012.  
The National Anticorruption Directorate and CVM have closely watched state 
institutions and public officials.  From March 2013 to March 2014, Romanian courts decided 
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on 281 convictions of corruptions against 857 people in this period. This included Cabinet 
Ministers, MPs, mayors, and former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase received his second 
corruption conviction.156 Prime Minister Nastase resigned in March 2006 due to corruption 
charges that he was later convicted of in 2012. In 2014, 23 judges, including four judges on 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice, six Chief prosecutors and six prosecutors were 
indicted on corruption charges.157 The National Anticorruption Directorate has begun 
investigations of over 4,200 corruption allegations in this same time span. These corruption 
charges and convictions are not likely the attacks to political opponents from a single regime 
due to the fact that there has not been a consistent coalition in power since 1996 when the 
neo-communist coalition lost its majority.  
State of the Media and Elections 
The economic crisis has hit the Romanian media hard. Advertising revenues fell 
sharply, and several media companies reported that their advertising revenues dropped by 70 
to 80 percent from 2008 to 2009.158 Media groups began to cuts jobs and wages. Some 
groups cut entire sections, like the editorials, and went from daily to bi-weekly or weekly.159 
Investigative journalism steadily disappeared due to the industry’s poor financial status.160 
Article 31 of Romanian’s Constitution guarantees the right to information, but government 
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officials have frequently blocked journalists from accessing information in corruption 
cases.161 
 The effects of the economic crisis on the diminished media landscape have allowed 
certain politicians to use the media to push their political agenda. Former Senator and media 
magnate Dan Voiculescu founded one of the largest media conglomerates in Romania— 
Intact Media Group. Vioculescu also founded the Romanian Conservative Party (PC), which 
is part of the USL coalition that currently has the majority in Parliament. There was 
widespread criticism claiming that Vioculescu used his media conglomerate for the 
impeachment campaign of President Basescu in 2012. There is an inherent conflict of interest 
when a Senator and political party founder has control over one of the largest media groups 
in Romania. Vioculescu was later convicted of corruption and money laundering and 
sentenced to ten years in prison—a reoccurring theme for Romanian politics.  The 
imprisoned Vioculescu was facing corruption charges again in 2014. His media outlets 
repeatedly attacked the chief anticorruption prosecutor who was pursuing graft charges 
against him. Other news outlets have been impacted by political influence as well. In July 
2014, a news station owned by Romania cable and satellite behemoth RCS-RDS fired 
reporter Cristi Citre after he criticized Prime Minister Ponta on his personal Facebook page.  
 As diversity in traditional media source outlets has faded away, many Romanians 
have chosen to use the Internet for news. Over 50 percent of the population used the Internet 
for news in 2014.162 The problem is that only a few online news outlets in the country are 
profitable. Online outlets cannot afford to conduct original reporting. Instead, they generally 
act as consolidators of already reported news, which limits the media pluralism and diversity. 




To make matters worse for Romania’s media landscape, reporters are often intimidated, 
verbally abused and threatened with physical harm by the police as well as the public. In 
November 2014, police arrested and beat reporter Stefan Mako who works for the online 
news site Casa Jurnalistului after he recorded police arresting a man in Bucharest. In August 
of that year, protesters attacked three journalists as they covered a rally. These attacks have 
damaged journalists ability and courage to cover certain news topics. 
Like the Hungarians, the Romanian public suffers from a lack of information due to 
self-censoring journalists, and news is often dominated by political attacks. The media, 
however, does not suffer from the same packing of regulatory and monitoring bodies with 
government loyalists as in Hungary. The National Audiovisual Council (CNA) is the sole 
media regulatory body in Romania. There are 11 members in the Council, and their 
appointments are as follows: three appointments for the Senate, three from the House of 
Deputies, two from the President and three from the Government. There are allegations that 
the Council is politicized, its decisions are often arbitrary and it is overall ineffective. 
Regardless, a single branch or political faction does not appear to have direct control over 
CNA.  
The Government and Parliamentary majority are responsible for selecting the 
leadership for the public broadcaster. Freedom House reported that this selection led to pro-
Government bias in media coverage for the 2014 Presidential election.163 There was also a 
lack of transparency in the allocation of public advertising funds provided by the EU for the 
2014 presidential election.164 It is still difficult to thoroughly assess the impact this coverage 
had on the Romanian public, especially due to the history of the Romanian citizenry’s 
                                                        




distrust of public institutions and lack of civic engagement.165 Although the state of 
Romania’s media appears to be in disarray, one political faction does not appear to have 
control and dominance over the media like the system the Fidesz government created in 
Hungary. There are conflicts of interests that suggest absence of media independence in some 
cases. Indeed, there are several instances of apparent government pressure on the media and 
the news outlet caving to the government pressure. For instance, firing a journalist for his 
critique of a government official on a private Facebook account threatens media 
independence and promotes self-censorship. However, the state of the media in Romania 
does not suggest systematic control exhibited in authoritarian states. Influence over the media 
is too fractured, and there is not one clear political faction in control.  
Civil Society 
 Civil society has not been able to completely and consistently entrench itself in 
Romania since the 1989 transition. At times, civil society has been part of democratic 
processes, particularly after the National Salvation Front (FSN) lost its majority in the 1996 
parliamentary elections. The National Salvation Front Romania quickly grasped power after 
Ceausescu was executed in 1989. But the regime changes that resulted over the next two 
decades made it difficult for civil society groups to create specific plans of attack other than 
its focus on corruption. Just as the media industry, civil society in Romania has been 
weakened by the country’s economic situation. Civil society groups have been historically 
underfunded in Romania. Moreover, civil society has remained relatively weak in Romania 
over the past three decades.  
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 Following Prime Minister Ponta’s resignation, for the first time in the history of 
Romania’s young democracy the President has promised to consult civil society in 
appointing the new prime minister.166 Current President Iohannis invited civil society 
representatives to consultation meetings for selecting nominees. Civil society representatives 
included individuals from Freedom House, Funky Citizens, Hope and Homes for Children 
Romania, and Salvati Dunarea Si Delta. The President’s inclusion of civil society in the 
process was in response to the ongoing protests of the Bucharest nightclub fire. On 
November 6, 2015, President Iohannis said, “I believed that, in this situation, when the street 
played a decisive role, when civil society formulated demands, requests, specific, it was very 
important to have this meeting.”167 These protests have provided the citizenry and civil 
society with momentum as a legitimate force in governance in Romania, but one should not 
hastily declare that civil society organizations will continue to be a factor in Romania’s 
democratic processes.  This may just be a move to appease the protestors. It is best to wait 
and see whether civil society’s strength continues to grow in Romania. 
Conclusions 
 No political faction in Romanian politics has been able to build an authoritarian 
regime since the state began democratizing in 1989. Nevertheless, Romania suffers from 
democratic deficits and rule of law violations in several areas. The Government has 
repeatedly abused its emergency ordinance powers in attempts to expand its powers and legal 
authority beyond the normal constraints of law. However, the Constitutional Court has 
blocked the Government on multiple occasions and has proved that the Court can be a 
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legitimate political check. The Constitutional Court’s check against the Prime Minister’s 
consolidation of power is a principal factor to prevent Romania’s authoritarian reversal. In 
contrast to Hungary’s structure, Romania has far more political branches and actors to 
prevent consolidation of power into one branch. The state’s strong Presidency has been an 
essential check against the limited separation between Parliament and the Prime Minister’s 
Office as well. Due to political turmoil and divisions between factions, packing informal 
institutions with loyalists has not occurred in Romania. Certain leaders may exercise stealth 
authoritarian tactics in a few areas, but because several of these components are lacking and 
do not interact together Romania’s government cannot be considered a stealth authoritarian 
regime. 
 There is still much democratic progress to be made in Romania, and the state is still 
teetering between democratic consolidation and backsliding to authoritarianism. Corruption 
is rampant and the legal process is often ineffective in these cases. The state of the media 
appears to be poor in several areas. Civil society plays a small role to check the government 
and promote transparency. This is caused by the Romanian public’s historic limited 
engagement in civic activity and underfunded civil society groups, but its presence is 
growing. Despite these democratic deficits, Romania’s government cannot be classified as 
authoritarian. There is no clear political faction that systematically controls branches of 






















International Organization Enforcement Mechanisms 
International organizations are frequently criticized as having weak enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that their laws and principles are respected. This section applies three 
hypotheses to the previous case studies with respect to EU enforcement mechanisms. First, 
IOs direct enforcement mechanisms are weak and cannot force a member state to comply 
with IO rules, because IOs do not have mechanisms to intervene with force. Next, indirect 
economic and political pressures applied by IOs do not promote long-term democratic 
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consolidation in transiting countries and cannot stop an authoritarian reversal. Both direct 
and indirect enforcements measures are weaker than the threat of withholding membership 
during the pre-accession period. Finally, IOs with limited monitoring mechanisms can fail to 
adequately recognize or control an authoritarian reversal. The theory that IOs cannot prevent 
authoritarian reversals is confirmed in the case of Hungary. The EU has been unable to 
prevent Hungary from reverting to authoritarianism under the Fidesz regime because of weak 
enforcement mechanisms and the lack of EU institutional monitoring. It is still unclear 
whether EU institutions will be able to promote long-term consolidation of democracy in 
Romania.  
The EU has direct means of enforcing its laws and fundamental values with Article 7 
of the Treaty of the European Union and its infringement procedures. EU institutions also use 
indirect means of enforcement—political and economic pressures—that are used more often 
than the direct mean of enforcements. Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union 
establishes democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the rights of minorities, as the Union’s fundamental values that are common to all 
Member States. EU institutions have limited direct enforcement mechanisms to stop or 
prevent authoritarian reversals. The primary enforcement instrument is the preventative and 
sanctioning mechanisms found Article 7 TEU, which is known as the “nuclear option.” 
Article 7 has both preventative and sanctioning mechanisms. The preventative mechanisms is 
found in Article 7 (1): 
On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European 
Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four 
fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may 
determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall 
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hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in 
accordance with the same procedure. 
 
Paragraphs 2-3 of the Article provide the sanctioning mechanisms where the European 
Council can revoke certain membership rights, including voting rights for Member States in 
the European Parliament. This mechanism, however, has incredibly demanding procedures 
for determining violations and is often obstructed by politics in EU institutions. Article 7’s 
sanctioning powers have never been used on a Member State. Therefore, the nuclear option 
operates primarily as a threat.  
The other direct enforcement mechanism is the infringement procedure.168 The EU’s 
European Commission initiates infringement proceedings against Member States suspected 
of violating EU law. Infringement procedures can either be resolved through Early 
Settlement or through the Formal Procedure, which has five potential steps. The first step of 
the Formal Procedure is the European Commission issues a letter of formal notice where the 
Member State has two months to comment and respond with the noncompliance problem. If 
the Member State does not respond, the Commission state’s why it believes the Member 
State has violated EU law, and the government has two months to comply. Third, if a 
Member State still does not comply, the Commission will refer the case to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The Commission can ask the ECJ to impose a lump 
sum and/or a penalty payment on the Member State. Fourth, the ECJ will decide whether the 
Member State has violated EU law if there is still noncompliance. If so, the Member State is 
required to change its laws or practices as soon as possible in accordance with the ECJ 
judgment. Finally, if the Member State still does not comply, the case is returned to the ECJ, 
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and at this time the Commission can request additional lump sum and/or penalty payments 
for noncompliance.  
The indirect enforcement, or enforcement measures that are outside the scope of EU 
formal procedures, that are typically issued by the EU are social pressure, multilateral 
economic pressure from other IOs, and issue linkage. Social pressure can be applied from EU 
institutions as well as other Member States. Social pressure is almost always applied from 
one or both of these actors above when a Member State is suspected of violating EU law. 
Issue linkage is a tool used by IOs to increase its leverage over a non-compliant Member 
State. Issue linkage ties compliance to access to treaty membership or economic packages. 
Withholding economic packages often occurs multilaterally between multiple IOs. For 
instance, the EU will link Member State compliance to an International Monetary Fund-EU 
economic package. The primary enforcement tactics used against Hungary’s authoritarian 
backsliding have been infringement procedures, issue linkage, and social pressure. These 
tactics used by the EU, however, have not been able to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian 
reversal. The main enforcement tactics used in Romania have been post-accession 
monitoring and evaluating and issue linkage. The following section examines the 
effectiveness of EU enforcement mechanisms when applied to Hungary and Romania’s 
democratic backsliding and violations of EU law. 
EU Enforcement Mechanisms in Hungary and Romania 
The EU has had difficulties framing valid legal arguments against the Fidesz 
leadership in Hungary. The Fidesz party legally rose to power through fair and free elections 
in 2010. Also, the Fidesz government has used constitutional loopholes and legal 
maneuverings to create its constitutional order. In 2012, the European Commission found 
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violations of EU law in Hungarian legislation and started an infringement procedure against 
the Member State in three issue areas: lowering of judicial retirement ages, the independence 
of the data protection ombudsman, and the independence of the central bank. The ECJ found 
that Hungary’s law that lowered the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and notaries 
constituted unjustified age discrimination.169 This is problematic because the EU has not 
addressed the systemic issue of Hungary’s authoritarian governance practices and other 
means that weaken the Constitutional Court’s strength and independence. 
The Fidesz government incrementally complied with the ECJ decision for lowering 
the judicial retirement age and slightly changed its law. The retirement age for judges was 
changed to 65 and the retirement process would take place over ten years, instead of retiring 
at 62 over a one-year process. In April 2014, the ECJ ruled that changes to Hungary’s data 
protection administration led to the unlawful replacement of the data protection 
ombudsman.170 The Fidesz Parliament removed the mandate of the data protection 
ombudsman, András Jóri, two years before his six-year term expired in 2014. On Jan.1, 2012, 
the independent data protection ombudsman institution was replaced with the National 
Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NADPFI). Officials of NADPFI 
are appointed by Parliament. Because ombudsman institutions exist to check legislatures and 
guarantee fundamental rights are ensured in legislation, the independence of the institution 
has been compromised by replacing the institution. The ECJ found that EU Council Directive 
95/46 requires that Member States guarantee the independence of authorities responsible for 
the protection of personal data. To date, there has been no real compliance with the ECJ 
ruling and the data protection authority still lies in the hands of the National Authority for 





Data Protection and Freedom of Information, which is headed by a Fidesz loyalist for a nine-
year term. If the European Commission wants to address this issue again, the matter can be 
returned to the ECJ once again.  
While the retirement age of judges and the independence of the data protection 
authority were partially resolved through ECJ decisions, the issue with the independence of 
Hungary’s Central Bank was resolved in a different manner and reference to the ECJ was not 
necessary. The European Commission used an infringement procedure that included the 
possibility of ECJ fines, but the Commission also used issue linkage in the matter. In 
December 2011, the EU and IMF made negotiations on a €15-20 billion financial assistance 
package contingent on Hungary restoring the independence its Central Bank. Once again, the 
Fidesz government packed the Central Bank’s key decision-makers with Fidesz loyalists, like 
the interest-rate setting committee and the head of the Central bank. In April 2012, the 
European Commission was satisfied with the changes made to the Central Bank’s legal 
status, and the issue by not brought before the ECJ. Over the past two years (2014-2015), 
however, the European Central Bank has criticized the Central Bank’s independence as 
Parliament and the Prime Minister still have control to choose head of the bank and its key 
decision-makers.171  
Political pressure has also been ineffective to persuade Hungary’s undemocratic 
practices. When democracy and rule of law are challenged, Prime Minister Orbán has 
frequently countered by challenging the democratic accountability of EU institutions: 
I was elected, the Hungarian government was also elected, as well as the European 
Parliament…But who elected the European Commission? What is its democratic 
                                                        





legitimacy? And to whom is the European Parliament responsible? This is a very 
serious problem in the new European architecture.172  
 
Prime Minister Orbán has continuously deflected political pressures and has pointed to 
democratic practices in other Member States to placate external criticisms. The best example 
is the government’s response to criticisms of the Media Laws that were passed in 2010. After 
EU institutions and the Venice Commission addressed specific concerns with the Media 
Laws, the Hungarian government released two documents that listed 20 European countries 
and EU-Member States as examples for precedents for each concern brought by the 
institutions. 
Central European University’s Center for Media and Communications Studies 
researched each of the 20 example countries and their corresponding laws.173 The study 
found that a majority of examples given “omit or inaccurately characterise relevant factors of 
the other countries’ regulatory systems, and as a result, the examples do not provide 
sufficient and/or equivalent comparisons to Hungary’s media regulation system.”174 For 
example, European institutions criticized the sanctioning powers of Hungary’s Media 
Authority over all media. In response, the Fidesz government listed 15 countries as 
precedents that sanction media—in some combination—with fines, suspensions, license 
revocations and/or terminations.175 However, the study’s experts found that Hungary’s Media 
Authority’s sanctioning scope was inconsistent with every country listed. The evaluation 
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found various regulatory bodies and/or the courts, which oversee a specific media sector, that 
impose media sanctions in the example countries, while Hungary’s Media Authority has 
sanctioning power over all media sectors and have sole decision-making power. Hungary has 
frequently adjusted its media laws due to external pressures and criticism from European 
institutions, but it appears that the Hungarian government has skillfully made minimal 
changes to its laws to appease Brussels.176 The core of the Media Laws has remained intact. 
 The Fidesz government has routinely reverted to noncompliance practices after the 
EU and ECJ have intervened. The EU has only targeted individual incidences of 
noncompliance with EU law rather than addressing the larger, systemic issues with the 
Fidezs governance. Moreover, the EU has been unable to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian 
reversal by attacking violations in this isolated manner. The EU needs to comprehensively 
address the systemic issues for the organization to stop authoritarian reversals. It is difficult 
to comprehensively ascertain why the EU has not been more strict with Hungary and enacted 
harsher punishments, even the applying Article 7 to Hungary. A common answer to this 
question is that the EU is primarily an economic international organization and does not care 
about issues outside the scope of regional fiscal matters. While this may be partially true, this 
answer is far too simplistic. A factor that may advance that theory is the democratic nature of 
the EU itself. Each country elects members to represent its Member State in the European 
Parliament (EP). Representatives in the EP may fear that applying Article 7 to a Member 
State may create a precedent that could be applied to their country for similar practices or 
other violations of EU law. Further, the EU was not likely prepared to address authoritarian 
reversal when it accepted the 2004 accession class, which had eight former communist 
Member States. In addition, the series of crises the EU has faced in recent years, including 
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the 2008 global economic crisis, the perpetual fiscal crisis in Greece, and now the Syrian 
refugee crisis, has likely deterred the EU’s attention away from democratic governance 
matters. Unfortunately, authoritarian governance by a Member State can create a new crisis 
or exacerbate a current crisis, like the fence built by the Fidesz government on the 
Hungarian-Serbian border and potential human rights violations inflicted on the Syrian 
refugees by Hungarian officers. 
In contrast to Hungary, enforcement of Article 2 has more successful in Romania, but 
this largely due to different post-accession conditions in these Member States. For the first 
time, the EU created a post-accession monitoring and evaluating mechanism to regulate the 
progress of Romania and Bulgaria after their accession in 2007. This mechanism is the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The problem, however, is the CVM only 
applies to the 2007 accession class, and it was not applied to previous accession classes. The 
democratic trajectory of Romania was been greatly influenced by the CVM. The lack of 
monitoring and evaluating following Hungary’s accession, which took place just three years 
before Romania, has also been a contributing factor to Hungary’s violation of EU 
fundamental values and its reversal to authoritarianism. There is not enough evidence to 
concretely determine whether the EU has been able to either prevent an authoritarian reversal 
or promote democracy in Romania, but the combination of the CVM and issue linkage have 
led to increased compliance with EU demands compared to Hungary. 
The European Commission decided in December 2006 to apply the CVM to Romania 
just prior to its accession the following year.177 The main focus of the CVM has been to 
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address rule of law shortcomings in judicial reform and the fight against corruption.178 
Article 38 of the European Commission Decision states that this safeguard measure should 
not remain in force longer than necessary and may be lifted when the shortcomings are met. 
The European Commission Decision set benchmarks for Romania to accomplish: 
(1) Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notable by enhancing the 
capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of the Magistracy. Report and 
monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedure codes. 
(2) Establish, as foreseen, and integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying 
assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing 
mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.  
(3) Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-
partisan investigations into allegation of high-level corruption.  
(4) Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within 
local government.179 
The CVM was originally intended to end three years after accession, but Article 38 allows 
the CVM to remain intact as long as these shortcomings persist. As of 2015, eight years after 
Romania’s accession, the CVM is still intact. 
During the Ponta Government’s impeachment attempt of President Basescu in 2012, 
the Constitutional Court was not the only actor who fought the Government. The European 
Commission played a crucial role to address the blatant violations of democracy and rule of 
law. The Commission decided to intervene and use the July 2012 CVM Report as an 
instrument to prevent the crisis from spreading.180 On July 11, 2012, Prime Minister went to 
Brussels to explain the political developments to European Parliament President Martin 
Schulz and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso. Prime Minister Ponta was 
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given an 11-point list with requirements that the Romanian Government was responsible to 
provide answers to, reconcile and demonstrate to EU institutions that Romania was 
respecting the rule of law and European standards. The list included: 
(1) Repeal Emergency Ordinance no. 38/2012 and Emergency Ordinance no. 
41/2012; 
(2) Ensure that Constitutional Court rulings on the quorum for a referendum and the 
scope of the Court’s responsibilities are respected; 
(3) Respect constitutional requirements in issuing emergency ordinances in the future; 
(4) Implement all the decisions of the Constitutional Court; 
(5) Ensure the immediate publication of all acts in the Official Journal, including the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court; 
(6) Require all political parties and government authorities to respect the 
independence of the judiciary; with a commitment to discipline any government or 
party member who undermines the credibility of judges or puts pressure on judicial 
institutions; 
(7) Appoint an Ombudsman enjoying cross-party support, through a transparent and 
objective process, leading to the selection of a person with uncontested authority, 
integrity and independence; 
(8) Introduce a transparent process for the nomination of the General Prosecutor and 
Chief Inspector of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. This should include 
open applications based on criteria of professional expertise, integrity and a track 
record of anti-corruption action. No nomination should be made under the acting 
Presidency; 
(9) Avoid any presidential pardons during the acting Presidency; 
(10) Refrain from appointing Ministers with integrity rulings against them; Ministers 
in that situation should step down; 
(11) Adopt clear procedures which require the resignation of Members of Parliament 
with final decisions on incompatibility and conflicts of interest, or with final 
convictions for high-level corruption.181 
 
The Romanian Government and Prime Minister Ponta responded and the rule of law crisis 
was averted, largely due to EU pressures. However, not all of the 11 recommendations have 
been thoroughly addressed. The 2013 CVM Report showed that Romania still had not 
appointed new leadership to the General Prosecutor’s Office or the Chief Inspector of the 
National Anti-Corruption Directorate.  
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The CVM also has strength through issue linkage.182 The primary use of issue linkage 
against Romania has involved its membership into the Schengen Area. The Schengen Area 
was established by the Schengen Agreement in 1985. The Schengen Area does not require 
passports or border controls at common borders. During the Soviet era, Romanian citizens 
did not have access to freely travel to neighboring countries. Following the collapse of Soviet 
control, freedom of movement has a priority for Romania citizens and the Government. The 
EU has consistently linked CVM performance in Romania with Schengen membership. The 
European Commission used issue linkage with the CVM and Schengen membership to 
prevent the Ponta Government’s consolidation of power and preserve the independence of 
the Constitutional Court. This issue linkage has also been a key tool for fighting rampant 
corruption, which Romanian corruption control bodies are still fighting and will so for years 
to come. On multiple occasions, the European Commission has discussed the removal of the 
CVM in Romania and Bulgaria.183 Nevertheless, other Member States have obstructed the 
CVM removal. Initially, Netherlands and Finland indicated that they would block agreements 
until more progress had been made to reform corruption control, judicial reform and the fight 
against organized crime in Bulgaria. However, these two Member States did not link CVM 
progress Schengen membership. The Member State link between CVM progress and 
Schengen membership came from Germany and France following the 2012 Romanian crisis.  
 The EU cannot use a ‘carrot or stick’ approach to promote governance in line with 
EU law and norms in Member States like it does pre-accession. This changed when the CVM 
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has been implemented on 2007 accession class, and the EU has not yet been decided whether 
Member States candidates, like Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, would have a similar 
post-accession mechanism if they were granted membership. The future of democracy in 
Romania remains unclear, and at times there is little hope. The lack of optimism can be 
partially attributed to the EU’s inability to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian reversal. The 
democratic deficits in Hungary and Romania are partially a result of the absence of domestic 
internalization of EU norms and democratic principles. The punishing nature of economic 
sanctions and political pressure promotes temporary compliance not domestic internalization 










Member State Internalization of International Law 
The presence of an authoritarian Member State in an international organization is not 
only a result of weak enforcement mechanisms, but also because the IO’s law and values 
have not been internalized by Member States. Signing and ratifying treaties is only the first 
step to compliance with international law. It is necessary for states to domestically internalize 
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international law for it to become binding.184 The same type of logic applies to accession into 
an international organization. Member State accession into an IO is like signing and ratifying 
an international treaty. Member States must internalize the IO’s laws as well as adopt the 
norms of appropriate behavior for Member States. In the case of the EU, each Member 
State’s accession into the Union involved different adjustments—institutionally and 
culturally—to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria.  Eight-out-of-ten countries in the EU’s 
fifth enlargement in 2004 were former Soviet Republics or Soviet-occupied states that 
governed under single-party communist dictatorships. Also, both Member States of the 2007 
accession class have the same authoritarian history. Since 1989, these states have engaged in 
democratic transitions to reshape their government structures and legal systems. The 
transitions also required reshaping their cultures to embrace democracy, capitalism, and 
Europeanization following their accession to the EU. 
Accession into the EU only requires surface level internalization of the Union’s laws 
and norms. When a Member State joins the EU, it is required to obey EU laws and treaties. 
Member State’s compliance and respect of EU values, like democracy and rule of law, is 
further complicated because the EU does not have a set homogenous principles defining 
democracy and rule of law for Member States to follow. These values are not clearly defined 
by Article 2 or any other treaty. The EU allows leeway for Member States to define these 
terms, and the Union handles violations on a case-by-case basis—as seen above in the 
enforcement section. During the accession process, candidates must pass the extensive 
Copenhagen Criteria. A key component of the Copenhagen Criteria is candidates 
demonstrate that they are democratic. In order to prove that the candidate is democratic, they 
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must demonstrate that the country has a procedural democracy: elections, rule of law, and a 
system of checks and balances. The problem is that procedural democracy does not guarantee 
that democracy will continue to exist in the candidate state, especially in transitioning states. 
Stealth authoritarianism, particularly in Hungary, portrays how a procedural democracy can 
be manipulated and fail to remain democratic. Further, while procedural democratization and 
anticipation of Europeanization was successful for many of the former Soviet satellites in the 
1990s, EU membership required not just procedural democratization but performance 
democratization, which had not yet existed in most of these countries.185  
Performance democratization is a progressive step beyond procedural democracy that 
entails good governance in areas of civil rights and political liberties, access to information, 
government transparency and accountability, and free and fair elections. Several of the 
transitioning new Member States had formal-legal democracies at the procedural level, but 
democracy had not reached consolidation at the social level. Theoretically, the EU assumed 
that accession would lead to formal-legal democracy in Member States as well as domestic 
internalization of EU laws and values into the society of each Member State. Despite partial 
institutional internalization of democracy, several societies in these former communist 
Member States have not yet internalized EU democracy and rule of law norms. The lack of 
internalization is particularly transparent in states with democratic deficiencies. It is 
imperative that norms are internalized both culturally and institutionally for long-term 
compliance. If there is a void in either side of the coin, the probability for full internalization 
is tremendously damaged.  
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 In both Romania and Hungary, EU democracy and rule of law norms have not been 
fully adopted culturally. This can be greatly attributed to each country’s Soviet past, but this 
is not the only explanation. First of all, democratization and internalization take time and 
patience. Hungary has been an EU member for hardly a decade, and Romania has been a 
member for even less time. Throughout each country’s democratic transition, societal trust in 
public officials and democratic institutions has wavered. To make matters worse, the 2008 
global economic crisis obstructed cultural internalization of EU democratic norms. The crisis 
has had devastating effects on both of these countries, which were not only transitioning 
democratically but also economically. The economic struggles led to public skepticism of 
both democracy and the EU. It is first necessary to observe how their Soviet histories have 
affected each state’s current government and legal systems. 
Soviet legal systems were implanted in Hungary and Romania during their Soviet 
occupations. Each country’s current government structure and legal system, as well as the 
public’s perceptions of these institutions, has been influenced by their Soviet pasts. Soviet 
law was unlike any other law. Soviet law was based off of the Marxism-Leninism doctrine, 
and it was “a doctrine to be accepted as indisputable truth.”186  Leaders, jurists and 
administrators in this legal system relied on Marxism-Leninism as their guide to interpret 
law. Marxism-Leninism doctrine believes that the exploitation of man by man was an 
inescapable result of private ownership. Rather than establishing a legal order for resolving 
disputes, Soviet law’s sole priority was to transform society towards the communist ideal—a 
fraternal society that is free of exploitation of man by man, and each person will work for the 
community according to his or her ability and will receive from the community according to 
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his or her needs.187 Soviet law was characterized by its economic and class preoccupations. 
Even though Soviet proponents considered Soviet society to be flawed, they still considered 
it to be far superior to capitalist societies. Since they knew their society were flawed, Soviet 
states were in a constant state a revolution in order to reach the final state of communism. 
Therefore, Soviets gave governments all the power they needed to reach the communist 
ideal, which resulted in authoritarian governance. 
There were three tasks of the Soviet government and law. First, national security of 
Soviet states and republics required that the power of the state to be consolidated into the 
hands of a few key officials and increased so enemies of socialism were discouraged from 
attacking Soviet regimes, which would ensure peace between states. The second task, which 
was economic, was to develop production based on socialist principles to create abundances 
so everyone could be provided with what they need. The third task was educational and 
sought to rid man of selfish tendencies and anti-social behavior that have been caused by a 
legacy of poor economic organization.188 Outside of Russia, the Soviet republics and satellite 
states were removed of all their previously existing laws, except for those that were in 
accordance with Soviet principles. Certain states, however, resisted the Soviet takeover. In 
1956, Hungarian workers and peasants rebelled against the Soviet-supported communist 
state. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution lasted only a few weeks and was ultimately 
suppressed by Soviet troops. Behind Alexander Dubcek’s leadership, Czechoslovakia’s 1968 
Prague Spring attempted to liberalize the Soviet-supported state. The revolt was quashed in 
August of that year after the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Members invaded 
Czechoslovakia. As the Soviet Union’s control over Central and Eastern Europe was 
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collapsing in the late 1980s, the Romanian Revolution successfully ended the Soviet-
occupation as revolutionary actors killed President Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife. The 
National Salvation Front and Ion Iliescu took control of Romania shortly after.  
The Soviet legal history has left its mark on Hungary and Romania. The purpose of 
law under this system was not individualistic and wasn’t used to resolve disputes. Rather, the 
purpose of Soviet law was communal—in the Marxist-Leninist sense. Citizens did not use 
the legal system to resolve disputes or challenge the government. Due to the single-party, 
communist government structure and lack of separation of powers, judicial review was non-
existent. The consolidation of great amounts of power into the hands of a few government 
officials greatly affected the role of the ordinary citizenry. Generally, ordinary citizens were 
subservient to those in powers, they did not participate in politics, and citizens did not 
challenge the government, except for a few instances of revolution and protest. This also led 
to distrust of public institutions and state actors. Distrust only grew when Soviet-supported 
governments began to control the media and increased surveillance over citizens following 
the attempted Hungarian Revolution in 1956. 
During Hungary and Romania’s democratic transitions, they had to reconfigure their 
government structures, institutional powers and legal systems. Hungary changed nearly every 
word of its Soviet-era Constitution (Law XX of 1949) with the 1989 amendments. Romania 
decided to draft a new constitution that was passed by a popular referendum in 1991. Even 
though each state had a new constitution that aimed to build democracy and rule of law, as 
the revolutionary fervor calmed toward the mid-1990s, the fragile post-communist societies 
needed to culturally adapt to democratic governance to legitimize the transition.  
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Distrust for public institutions has remained strong in Hungary and Romania. This 
distrust is often justified due to the rampant corruption in both countries. Yet, there are 
exceptions to this rule. Public opinions polls in the late 1990s showed that Hungarians 
considered the Constitutional Court to be the most highly respected political institution in 
Hungary after the Court opened in January 1990.189 The high regard for Hungary’s 
Constitutional Court is greatly due to actio popularis, which provided any citizen standing to 
challenge any law before the Court. The reputation of the Court has since been damaged due 
to the Fidesz government’s actions to control it. The value of the Romania Constitutional 
Court, which has fought for democracy in several instances, has frequently been questioned. 
The Romanian legal culture has been heavily influenced by the Soviet era. The cultural norm 
is not use the legal system to resolve disputes or challenge the government. Instead, Romania 
has placed this duty in the hands of Parliament. The Romanian public and politicians have 
consistently questioned the necessity of its Constitutional Court as well as the entire judicial 
system. 
Romania’s Constitutional Court did not have the final arbiter powers over 
constitutional disputes until these powers were granted to the Court with the 2003 
amendments. The Court’s role in the democratization process throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s was minimal if not irrelevant. In a 1997 interview, President of the Romanian 
Constitutional Court Ion Muraru said, “[i]n our country, in the Constituent Assembly, it was 
hard to convince even the lawyers that we needed a distinct authority of the sort.”190 In 2013, 
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Romania attempted to amend its Constitution again. Reduction and definition of the 
Constitutional Court’s powers was a high priority. Romania’s Constitution, however, was not 
amended when Parliament could not reach an agreement. The limited faith in the efficacy of 
the Constitutional Court is likely conflated by the public’s distrust of the ordinary courts. 
Several judges, magistrates and prosecutors from Romania’s ordinary courts have been 
charged with corruption. Opinion polls have consistently shown that the public considers 
legal institutions and professionals to be corrupt, and that the judiciary is politicized, which 
leads to flawed administration of justice. 191 
In recent years, the Hungarian and Romanian public have come to believe that 
democracy has not performed well in both countries—for good reason.192 While civic 
participation has fluctuated in Hungary since its democratic transition, civic participation in 
Romania has been nearly nonexistent over the past 25 years. Civic involvement in politics 
and democracy has historically remained low in Romania, primarily because of contempt for 
the government officials. The complicated political processes that sections of the population 
are unable to fully comprehend, the public and civil society’s inability to intervene in 
democratic practices and policies due to the political factions strongholds, and distrust of 
public institutions due to rampant corruption have also prevented civic participation.193 While 
public perceptions of democratic performance in both Member States have remained low, the 
2008 global economic crisis further damaged the public’s perception that democracy can 
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function effectively in their countries. Hungarian and Romanian citizens placed much of the 
blame for their economics woes on democracy and the EU after the global economic crisis. 
Hungary and Romania recently became EU members prior to the 2008 economic 
crisis. This crisis derailed the cultural internalization of EU norms. The crisis hit 
underdeveloped EU Member States especially hard because of their intra-EU division of 
labor role to produce low-skill products, whereas more advanced economics, like Germany 
and Nordic countries, have ‘knowledge economies’ that focus on technology and finance.194 
In relation to other Member States, Hungary and Romania are both considered to be 
underdeveloped. The 2008 crisis caused slower growth, social mobility to reverse, and 
populism, isolationism, and nationalism to increase in popularity in many underdeveloped 
EU Member States.195 Slower growth has led to reduced private consumption and 
investment, less public spending and austerity programs. As Hungary and Romania became 
Member States, they anticipated that EU membership would provide them with Western 
European-type welfare safety nets. Instead, they received public spending cuts and austerity 
measures. The lower-middle class was first hit by the crisis. The lower-middle class rose 
from the lower class due to new jobs and access to credit after the communist era ended, but 
the crisis pushed this class back down. This has caused the already stretched social welfare 
programs to be further stretched. The traditionally poor were also negatively affected, 
because the austerity measures led to cuts in public social welfare spending that has already 
been stretched thin. Finally, the young adult sector of the population was negatively affected 
because this group could not find jobs, even after graduating from universities. The economic 
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crisis created social and economic tensions. The result of these tensions has been to look 
inward for solutions; therefore, stoking ardent nationalism, populism and protectionism in 
some states. Citizens in these states that were hit hardest by the economic crisis have been 
the most likely to become anti-democracy and anti-EU. In 1991, 74 percent of the Hungarian 
population approved of the change to democracy, but the approval rating dropped to 56 
percent in 2009.196 In addition, a 2009 study showed over 70 percent of Hungarians polled 
said that they were better off during communism.197 Hungarian citizens did not have faith in 
democratic governance or EU-type democracy. Conditions were perfect for the populist 
Fidesz party to grab power and create a new, anti-democratic (authoritarian) government. 
The 2010 Parliamentary election in Hungary was a free and fair election that was not 
manipulated by the Fidesz party or any other party. It was simply a democratic response by 
the Hungarian voters. The election of the Fidesz government in 2010 was a response by the 
Hungarian public to the poor economic situation and the party’s populist, nationalist, and 
isolationist agenda. Before Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party gained their supermajority, 
they attacked the social-democratic party’s (MszP) Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and 
forced his resignation in 2009. During a speech given at an MszP party meeting in 2006, 
which was intended to be confidential, Prime Minister Gyurcsány said that he had been lying 
for over a year and a half about the economic situation in Hungary in order to win elections a 
few months earlier. After a recording of the speech was later leaked to Hungary’s state radio, 
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Orbán and Fidez members began to call for Gyurcsány’s resignation. Protests broke out and 
continued in Budapest until Gyurcsány finally resigned.  
Economic crises often lead to public leanings toward the conservative right of the 
political spectrum, and Gyurcsány’s actions exacerbated the collapse of Hungary’s political 
left. The public’s fear and desire for a solution to the economic crisis resulted in electing a 
populist and nationalistic government that ran on a platform that opposed liberal democracy 
and the EU. In a 2009 speech in the Kötcse village, Orbán blamed Hungary’s situation on the 
bipolar political system, and called for this system to vanish and be replaced a by center-field 
political power to take its place—a single party state.198 Orbán obviously saw himself as the 
single party state’s leader. Rhetoric that the 1989 transition was an ‘insufficient transition’ or 
a ‘stolen transition’ began to gain traction in Hungary at this time. The Fidesz party ran on a 
nationalist, anti-EU platform. Despite Orbán’s role in the democratic transition in 1989, 
Orbán promised to “transition the transition.” In 2010, the center-right Fidesz party and far 
right Jobbik party combined to win 70 percent of the vote.199 The Fidesz party’s vision for 
Hungary’s ‘second transition’ is a strong, unified nation-state with ideological foundations 
rooted in anti-modernism in which Europe has become decadent and should return to its 
Christian roots, and Hungary should return to its traditional Christian roots. The result of this 
‘second transition’ has demolished democratic governance and rule of law in Hungary. There 
has been a tremendous regression in the internalization process of EU norms in Hungary’s 
institutions. The Fidesz agenda has been so deeply entrenched into government institutions 
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that it would be incredibly difficult for the public to require institutional compliance even if 
democratic and EU values do become the cultural norm in Hungary.  
 Romania did not experience the same right-wing nationalism and populism that 
Hungary and several other European states embraced following the economic crisis. The 
majority coalition in Romania has been consistently held by Romania’s left side of the 
political spectrum. Nevertheless, the crisis created further political turmoil in the already 
turbulent political arena. Romania’s underdeveloped economy was vulnerable prior to the 
2008 crisis. The domestic economic crisis that followed led the Government to negotiate and 
accept a 13 billion Euro IMF-EU-World Bank loan in March 2009. However, the loan had a 
conditionality that reduced public spending, which led to implementing austerity measures. 
Public sector wages were cut by 25 percent and many extra-benefits were cut, 200,000 public 
employees were laid off between 2009 and 2011, government agencies were restructured, 
health insurance became taxed, unemployment and child benefits were cut by 15 percent, and 
several state enterprises were privatized.200 None of the most unpopular measures, however, 
were implemented until after the 2009 presidential election.  
After President Basescu was reelected, he began to push for implementing these 
austerity measures. In June 2010, Prime Minister Boc and his Cabinet implemented the 25 
percent public sector wage cut, the health insurance tax, and 15 percent cut in social security. 
These austerity measures infuriated the public that was already suffering from the effects of 
the crisis. Prime Minister Boc and his Cabinet were later forced out of office in 2012 after a 
series of protests. The perpetually inactive citizenry took to the streets in Bucharest and 
protested the Government’s austerity measures. It was not just austerity measures that they 
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were protesting, however. The citizenry linked the austerity measures to their discontent with 
those in power and the endless corruption. Whether or not the population believes in 
democratic principles remains in question. Regardless, a strong majority of the population 
believes that democracy has not worked in Romania due to poor democratic performance by 
public officials and institutions, primary due to corruption.  
Despite some instances of successful EU democratic and rule of law norm 
internalization, these norms have not been culturally internalized into either Member State’s 
domestic society. Until there is cultural internalization, the institutions that promote and 
ensure democracy and rule of law will not be held accountable and required to ensure that 
these norms are respected. The 2008 economic crisis was a tremendous setback for the 
cultural internalization process. In Hungary, the crisis sparked the public dismissal of 
democracy and the EU that led to the decline towards authoritarianism. The crisis 
exacerbated the Romanian public’s derisive attitude toward its government and further 








To answer the central the question—under which conditions does an authoritarian 
Member State exist in an international organization that requires democratic governance in 
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its treaty law—this thesis examined the Member State from multiple angles. First, this thesis 
began from the perspective of the Member State to comprehend how a Member State might 
construct an authoritarian government despite an IO’s legal requirement for democratic 
governance. Next, the perspective from the IO observed the EU’s enforcement mechanisms 
and its response to undemocratic governance. The final section employed the vantage point 
of the Member State’s domestic society. This thesis aimed to answer why a Member State 
would not only violate IO treaty law and norms, but also revert to authoritarianism by 
investigating cultural internalization of IO norms and democratic principles.  
This thesis found that Hungary not only employed all the components of stealth 
authoritarianism, but the Member State has also experienced an authoritarian reversal and 
should be labeled as an authoritarian regime. Application of stealth authoritarian theory to 
Romania has provided tremendous context to the theory. Romania suffers from severe 
democratic deficits due to rampant corruption and a weak ordinary judiciary, but the Member 
State cannot be classified as authoritarian. Despite efforts made by former Prime Minister 
Ponta, neither the President nor the Prime Minister has been able to consolidate its power and 
effectively remove formal checks against their authority. The Constitutional Court has 
maintained its independence and demonstrated its strength as it battled Ponta’s efforts to 
eliminate its judicial review powers. The consistent changes in political leadership and 
perpetual political turmoil have also prevented one faction from gaining an authoritarian 
foothold. 
Comparison of these case studies shows that a stealth authoritarian regime must 
be able to consolidate power into the executive branch and remove formal checks from 
the legislative and judicial branches in order to start working towards packing informal 
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institutions, controlling the media, ensuring ruling party victories in elections and 
weakening civil society. There were two primary factors—one internal and one 
external— that influenced the differing outcomes in Hungary and Romania: the checks  
created by the structure of governmental branches and the EU’s Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM). 
The weak separation of powers between branches and limited checks against the 
executive branch in Hungary’s government structure is a major factor for its authoritarian 
reversal. The separation between the executive and legislative branch is almost nonexistent. 
The judiciary, the Constitutional Court, is an essential check against these branches.  Once 
the Fidesz government constructed its legal authority with the Fundamental Law, the 
government used its supermajority in Parliament to dominate and control the judicial branch. 
After a long battle with the Constitutional Court, Prime Minister Orbán and the Fidesz 
Parliament eliminated the judicial check against its power and continued to pack the Court 
with Fidesz loyalists. Currently, the Fidesz government has appointed the majority of the 
Court’s justices. Also, the Court does not have substantial judicial review powers that could 
potentially block the Prime Minister and Parliament’s overextension of powers beyond those 
found in the Fundamental Law. Once the formal checks against the power centralized into 
Prime Minister Orbán’s hands were eliminated, the Fidesz government could then begin to 
pack informal institutions with loyalists and expand the powers of these bureaucratic 
agencies, control the media, reconfigure election and campaign laws to ensure the Fidesz 
government maintained its power and principal authoritarian tool—its supermajority.  
The structure of Romania’s government is far more complex and has several more 
checks than Hungary’s structure. The Fidesz government only needed to eliminate the 
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judicial branch’s formal check to consolidate its power into the Prime Minister’s hands. 
However, Romania’s structure has a two-headed executive branch and a bicameral 
Parliament in addition to Romania’s Constitutional Court. First, the President of Romania has 
far more powers than the ceremonial President of Hungary. The President of Romania has 
expansive powers, similar to the President of the U.S. In contrast, Hungary’s President has 
only a few minor powers, which includes veto authority over bills passed in Parliament. 
Romania’s President is also elected rather than appointed by the majority in Parliament. The 
Romanian President has constantly battled the Prime Minister for executive branch control, 
but neither has been able to consolidate power into their office since Nicolae Ceausescu’s 
assassination, which marked the start of the democratic transition.  
In addition to the extra presidential check in Romania, its Constitutional Court has 
been able to maintain its independence and strength. This is largely due to the selection 
process of the Court’s justices and their term limits. The Court is comprised of nine justices 
that serve nine-year terms, which cannot be prolonged or renewed. Three justices are 
appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, three by the Senate and three by the President. The 
Constitutional Court renews three justices every three years. The selection process and term 
limits reduce one faction or branch’s ability to pack the Court, because the selection process 
involves input from several institutions. Also, the composition the Court changes every three 
years. Hungary’s Constitutional Court was far easier for the Fidesz government to pack. 
First, justices are nominated by a vote in Parliament and confirmed by the President’s 
signature. Because the majority in Parliament chooses the Hungarian President, there is not a 
legitimate separation between these branches. The Fidesz Parliament used its supermajority 
to change the rules for nominating justices and removed the requirement for input from 
 108 
oppositional parties in Parliament. Next, Parliament changed the law to increase the number 
of justices from 11 to 15. Finally, the retirement age for justices, rather than term limits, 
allows Hungary’s authoritarian government an additional means to pack the Constitutional 
Court in comparison to Romania. Each Member State’s current leadership did not create the 
initial design of their government structure. These structures were assembled as the countries 
transitioned to democracy in 1989. Authoritarian reversals and stealth authoritarianism 
require maneuvering through the institutions in place. Moreover, Hungary’s governmental 
structure has proven far easier to work through for leaders with authoritarian goals. 
Recognition of these weaknesses should be considered by democratizing states.  International 
organizations should also consider this point for pre-accession conditionality as well as 
assessment for which institutions to protect to prevent authoritarian reversals.  
 The public’s ability to influence the government’s actions has also been a primary 
difference between Hungary and Romania. There have been several large protests in 
Budapest, Hungary, over the past five years, but most of them have been inconsequential. 
Initially, it appeared that the Internet tax protest in October 2014 was successful when the 
Hungarian Parliament decided to not pass the tax. However, several prominent members of 
Hungary’s civil society contend that the Fidesz Parliament never planned to pass the Internet 
tax, and it was only created to distract the public from other bills Parliament was in the 
process of enacting that would be publicly unfavorable.201 In addition to not satisfying all the 
components of stealth authoritarian, the Romanian public’s ability to persuade its leaders 
with protests further demonstrates that the Member State cannot be considered authoritarian. 
The nightclub fire protests in Bucharest led to Prime Minister Ponta’s resignation, who was 
                                                        
201 This is the opinion found from interviews with Internet Tax Protest organizer Gulyás Balázs and 
the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union. 
 109 
the main Romanian leader that threatened to push Romanian toward authoritarianism. The 
protests also gave civil society groups a seat at the table to select the new Prime Minister, 
which was unprecedented. Authoritarian governments generally do not respond to the public 
will, and if they do so, it is likely to be an inconsequential concession, like the Internet tax in 
Hungary.  
The other key difference that has been influential for the state of democracy in 
Hungary and Romania is external—the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM). The EU’s mechanisms to enforce its law and safeguard democracy—economic 
sanctions, political pressures, infringement procedures, and Article 7—have been overall 
ineffective to counteract and prevent undemocratic practices by Hungary and Romania’s 
governments. The CVM, however, has been a powerful tool for the EU in Romania. The 
problem is that the CVM was only applied to the 2007 accession class (Romania and 
Bulgaria), and there are no institutional monitoring mechanisms for the other former-
authoritarian Member States, including Hungary. The CVM has been monitoring severe 
democratic deficiencies in Romania since it became a Member State in 2007. Because of the 
constant monitoring and evaluation of a Member State’s democratic progress, it would be 
incredibly difficult for a stealth authoritarian regime to slip past the CVM. The lack of 
monitoring in Hungary is a key point of difference between the two Member States that has 
affected their democratic outcomes.  
The CVM has been used as a leverage tool to coerce compliance in Romania. 
Authoritarian crises have been appeased in this Member State after EU officials utilized the 
CVM as a tool for leverage with issue linkage. The EU has primarily tied the CVM with 
membership into the Schengen Treaty, which would allow Romania to enter the EU’s free 
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movement zone without passports or any constraints. Schengen Membership is especially 
important to former Soviet-occupied Member States. During the Soviet-occupation, 
Romanian citizens were not able to travel freely to neighboring countries without going 
through exhaustive bureaucratic processes. The CVM has promoted democracy in Romania 
as well as pacified authoritarian crises. However, there is still no conclusive evidence that the 
EU can prevent an authoritarian reversal in Romania if a faction can garner enough strength. 
This doubt arises primarily because of the EU’s inability to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian 
reversal. 
The final component addressing the central question pertains to a Member State’s 
domestic culture and internalization of EU democratic norms. Both countries have legal 
systems and institutions that have been greatly influenced by their Soviet pasts. The reason 
why Hungary has reverted to authoritarian and why Romania has not fully consolidated to 
democracy is because their cultures are still skeptical of democracy and EU norms. Both 
Member States had just joined the EU prior to the 2008 global economic crisis. This crisis 
hindered the norm internalization process. Hungarian and Romanian citizens believed that 
the EU would provide a social welfare safety net in the case of an economic crisis, which 
their respective governments no longer provided after communism. The EU was unable to 
genuinely help those in need when the 2008 economic crisis eliminated jobs, cut wages, and 
in some cases increased taxes. Democracy and EU norms had also not yet been internalized 
into Romania’s culture. The 2008 crisis was yet another chapter of the Romanian 
population’s distrust of public officials’ ability to provide them with a legitimate democracy. 
The public blamed the austerity measures that resulted from the crisis on institutional 
corruption. Political turmoil broke out again with civic protests and the removal of yet 
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another Prime Minister and his Government. Romania has not culturally internalized the 
EU’s democratic norms because of the poor democratic performance by government officials 
and institutions. Until Romania has culturally internalized democracy and EU legal norms 
and demand them as the appropriate standard of behavior for its leadership and institutions, 
Romania will remain in a state of transition rather than democratic consolidation. Therefore, 
Romania will remain in greater peril of reverting to authoritarianism. Due to the EU’s 
inability to prevent Hungary’s reversal, this is a grave concern.  
In Hungary, a large percentage of the citizenry, especially those most affected by the 
crisis, began to blame their economic woes on democracy and the EU. They called for a 
government that promoted nationalism, isolation, and protectionism. As a result, the 
Hungarians elected the Fidesz government to a supermajority in 2010, because this party ran 
a populist platform that the citizenry was demanding. From there, the Fidesz government 
reverted to authoritarianism, partially with the will of the people. However, it is safe to 
estimate by the 2014 election results that approval of the Fidesz government is shrinking. 
The problem is that the Fidesz government has so entrenched its authoritarian regime into 
Hungary that the voters will likely not be able to remove this government without extreme 
measures, like a revolution. Stealth authoritarianism in the EU may resurge in other 
transitioning Member States with the Syrian Civil War refugee crisis. 
The Syrian refugee crisis hit Europe this summer (2015), and it appeared that EU and 
its Member States were ill prepared. Hungary is one of the first entry point into the EU’s free 
movement zone as it is located in the Union’s south-east corner. Hungary’s populist, 
nationalist response to the refugee crisis began with a billboard campaign sponsored by the 
Fidesz government. Billboards were placed throughout Hungary that contained populist 
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messages, including “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the jobs of Hungarians!” and “If 
you come to Hungary, you have to keep our laws!”202 The problem was that these billboards 
were written in Hungarian, and the Syrian refugees could not read them. It seems that these 
billboards were actually created to stir up populist fervor against immigration and Syrian 
refugees. As the number of Syrian refugees attempting to enter Hungary increased, 
Hungary’s isolationist response was to build a fence on Hungary’s border with Serbia and 
Croatia. There have been several allegations of human rights violations for spraying refugees 
and journalists with tear gas and imprisoning refugees. The Fidesz government even passed a 
law that made it illegal for refugees to enter Hungary without permission. As a result, 
thousands of refugees were imprisoned. This crisis has created fear and panic not only in 
Hungary but also throughout Europe.  
Further research on stealth authoritarian, international organizations and the effects of 
crises on transitioning Member States can be conducted on the developing situation in 
Poland. Poland, which was in the 2004 EU accession class with Hungary, may be the next 
former-communist EU Member State to employ stealth authoritarianism. Poland’s voters 
have responded to the refugee crisis in Europe by electing a populist and nationalist 
government. After spending the past eight years as a minority party, the right-wing populist 
Law and Justice party (PiS) won a majority in Parliament in November 2015. Law and 
Justice party leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, is an admirer of Viktór Orbán and his idea of 
illiberal governance. The PiS party campaigned on a populist platform, which included 
                                                        
202 Thorpe, Nick. “Hungary’s Poster War on Immigration,” BBCNews.com. 14 June 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33091597 
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opposition to gay rights and fear of Muslims.203 PiS leadership has began to enact practices 
similar to those of the Fidesz government. There have been two major offenses against 
democracy and rule of law in just first few weeks of the PiS government’s leadership. First, 
the independence of the Constitutional Court was threatened when the President Andrzej 
Duda, who was a former member of the PiS party, refused to swear in five new judges who 
were selected by the previous Parliament. The PiS Parliament has also amended the 
Constitution to void the election of judges by previous Parliaments.204  The second major 
offense came from a presidential pardon. President Duda pardoned the head of the 
Anticorruption Bureau, who was accused of abusing his power, before the Court issued its 
final decision. These actions have caused several Polish and international legal scholars to 
label Poland as a state that is no longer governed by rule of law. There is also fear that a 
constitutional coup is occurring in Poland.205 The new government has also changed the 
appointment process for the heads of the public media by the President and Parliament. As of 
December 2015, the PiS government is only in its second month of power. The situation in 
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